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A MORAL RIGHTS THEORY OF PRIVATE LAW

ANDREW S. GOLD*
ABSTRACT
Private law—the law of torts, contracts, and property—is at an
interpretive impasse. The two leading conceptual theories of private
law—corrective justice and civil recourse theories—both suffer from
significant weaknesses. Given these concerns, private law may even
seem incoherent. The problem is not insurmountable, however. This
Article offers a new way to understand private law. I will argue that
private law is best understood as a means for individuals to exercise
their moral enforcement rights.
Moral enforcement rights exist when an individual may legitimately use coercion to force another individual to comply with his or
her moral duties. Not all interpersonal relationships implicate moral
enforcement rights. However, when moral enforcement rights do
exist, the law typically provides a private right of action. Indeed, the
private right of action fills an important need, given the backdrop of
existing legal regulation. Individuals usually may not coerce a
wrongdoer on their own, and thus require some other mechanism to
do so. The private right of action can be seen as a substitute means
of enforcement given that the state ordinarily prohibits self-help.
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Recognizing this basis of private law allows us to explain a variety
of private law remedies from compensatory damages to injunctive
relief. It also accounts for the characteristic structure of the private
right of action. In this way, a moral rights-based theory offers an
important advance over leading corrective justice accounts. At the
same time, a moral rights-based theory also provides an appealing
basis for the private right of action. As a result, it avoids the normative doubts that often beset civil recourse theories.
Finally, this Article has important normative implications. A
moral rights understanding helps us to assess whether private law
should be reformed in those cases in which legal and moral practices
overlap. In such cases, it is often thought that if legal principles
diverge from moral principles, the legal principles should be
changed. Interpreting the private right of action as a means to
exercise moral enforcement rights suggests that core private law
doctrines converge with conventional moral principles.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal theorists are in a bind. One might expect that after years
of debate the conceptual basis of private law would be settled. Yet
private law—the law of torts, contracts, and property—has proven
difficult to explain in conceptual terms. It is not that there are no
theories available. Leading accounts ground private law in principles of corrective justice1 or civil recourse.2 Unfortunately each of
the existing approaches has significant weaknesses. This Article
offers a new theory, grounded in individuals’ moral enforcement
rights.
A corrective justice theory focuses on the judicial tendency to
order remedies that make a plaintiff whole. The law, on this view,
rectifies injuries caused by a legal wrong.3 For corrective justice
theorists, private law is thus explained in terms of a wrongdoer’s
duty to correct a wrong, or a wrongful loss.4 In contrast, a civil
recourse theory focuses on the structure of the private right of
action. This theory argues that private law fields—most commonly,
1. For leading corrective justice accounts of tort law, see JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND
WRONGS (1992) [hereinafter COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS]; ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY,
RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1999); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995);
Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992). Although
many corrective justice theorists focus on tort law, there are also significant corrective justice
accounts in the contract law setting. See Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE
THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001); Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict
Liability with Corrective Justice in Contract Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3013 (2007); Andrew
S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
2. For leading civil recourse accounts, see Jason Solomon, Equal Accountability Through
Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765 (2009); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not
Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003) [hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse]; Benjamin
C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 643-44 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) [hereinafter
Zipursky, Private Law]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of
Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 82-86 (1998) [hereinafter Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse];
see also John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right
to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) (suggesting a constitutional
grounding for a right to redress); Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory,
92 IOWA L. REV. 957 (2007) (suggesting a recourse-based account of punitive damages).
3. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 1, at 142-44 (describing liability in private law as
corrective justice).
4. See, e.g., COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 1, at 374 (describing tort law in
terms of an injurer’s duty to make good a loss).
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the law of torts—are best understood in terms of the plaintiff’s right
to redress if she was wronged by another.5 Civil recourse theories
explain the private right of action as a means for wronged parties
to act against the person who wronged them.6 This notion sounds in
revenge, in holding someone accountable, or in “getting satisfaction.”
Moral enforcement rights suggest a new way to see the private
law structure. A moral enforcement right exists when an individual
has the moral standing to coerce another individual in order to
prevent or correct a wrong.7 This idea has been recognized in moral
philosophy, but its significance is underappreciated in legal theory.8
We can better understand private law if we see it as a legal path for
individuals to force compliance with their moral rights in cases in
which such individuals have legitimate standing to use coercion.
The claimant’s act of enforcement is then the central feature of
private law.
A hypothetical may help to illustrate. In a state of nature, assume
that two individuals, A and B, reach an agreement. A agrees to give
B a useful thing he possesses—let us say a table—in return for B
working on A’s behalf for several hours—let us say assistance in
building a house. B proceeds to do this work according to the agreement’s terms and then requests the table. A owes a duty, pursuant
to the agreement, to give B the promised table. Suppose A refuses
to hand it over. In such a case, A has a continuing responsibility to
hand over the table. Moreover, B would be justified in taking the
table from A, irrespective of A’s continued refusal to provide B with
the table.
In this prelegal state of affairs, the result of the agreement,
assuming the table originally belongs to A, is that B has a primary
moral right to the table, and A has a primary moral duty to provide
the table to B. When A fails to provide the promised performance,
B has a remedial moral right to the table—or if that is no longer an
5. See generally Zipursky, Private Law, supra note 2.
6. See id. at 646 (describing the right of action in tort law as “a power to act against the
defendant through the state”).
7. For a discussion of the link between moral rights and coercion, see infra Part II.A.1-2.
Although I refer to it as a right, in Hohfeldian terms, the moral enforcement right can be
denoted as a “privilege.” See infra note 144.
8. For a discussion of this type of standing in moral philosophy, see infra Part II.A.3.
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option, a right to the next best thing—and A has a remedial duty to
provide the table—or the next best thing. Primary and remedial
moral rights and duties are not the only normative concepts at issue
in this fact pattern, however. There is also the question of suitable
responses to a breach. It is here that a moral enforcement right
comes into play. This is a distinct moral concept, and it provides a
means to understand private law.
B’s justifiable responses to A’s failure to meet his remedial duties
are implicated by these facts. Not all violations of moral rights
correspond to justifiable coercion. In this case, however, B has a
moral right to force a remedy. Under the facts of this hypothetical,
it would be appropriate for B to simply take the table from A,
presumably without violence, if A continues in his refusal to hand
over the table. B might forgive A’s failure, but, morally speaking,
she would be within her rights to take the table.9 A would also have
a corresponding moral duty not to interfere with B’s efforts to take
the table from him, a reflection of his original moral duty to provide
the table pursuant to the agreement.10
But what if we are no longer in a state of nature? Strictly
speaking, private law enforces legal rights and legal duties, not
moral rights and moral duties. As such, it is not immediately
obvious how private law is implicated by the above series of moral
rights, duties, and legitimate coercive remedies—the law refers to
distinctly legal concepts.11 The law’s provisions need not correspond
to the moral rights and duties that exist in a state of nature with
respect to promises, agreements, and other interpersonal relationships.
Although it is true that moral rights and legal rights are distinct,
we can understand them as normatively related. One way of interpreting private law is to see it as a substitute for a wronged party’s
9. On the potential for divergence between one’s moral duties and one’s moral rights, see
Jeremy Waldron, A Right To Do Wrong, 92 ETHICS 21, 24-25 (1981).
10. Or so I will argue. There are theorists whose work suggests that, in a state of nature,
a party in the wrongdoer’s position would be appropriately able to resist. See Arthur Ripstein,
Private Order and Public Justice: Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV. 1391, 1415-21 (2006).
11. The view that legal and moral concepts are distinct does not preclude them from
intersecting, however. For an insightful analysis of how legal practices and moral practices
sometimes overlap, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120
HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007).
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right to rectify or prevent violations of her primary moral rights.12
In a civil society, self-help is often prohibited. When moral rights
would be legitimately enforceable by a wronged party in the absence
of a civilized state, it is appropriate for the wronged party to have
an alternative avenue for enforcing them. The legal rights and
powers that constitute private law can thus be conceptually linked
to individuals’ underlying moral rights and duties.
Consider the case of a wrong that has already been committed.
All else equal, the commission of a wrong means the wrongdoer is
now morally required to do the next best thing to performing his or
her primary obligation.13 The wrongdoer might not do so. Corrective
justice, in other words, might not be forthcoming. We can then see
the private right of action as a substitute for obtaining justice by
means of self-help.14 When individuals are subject to the state’s
regulations and no longer permitted to bring about corrective justice
on their own, their moral right to correct a wrong still remains.15
The state accordingly takes on an obligation to provide an alternative legal means of enforcement in those cases in which self-help
would otherwise be justified.
Notably, the aim of private law on this account is not to bring
about corrective justice as such; rather, it is to enable private individuals to bring about corrective justice when they are entitled to
do so.16 The private right of action may be grounded in corrective
12. Civil recourse theorists offer a related, but distinct, argument concerning the private
right of action. For these theorists, private law is a substitute for acts of recourse by means
of self-help. See, e.g., Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 735-38.
13. See John Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice, 30
LAW & PHIL. 1, 32-33 (2011) (discussing a theory of corrective justice along these lines); see
also Joseph Raz, Personal Practical Conflicts, in PRACTICAL CONFLICTS: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS 172, 189-93 (Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler eds., 2004) (analyzing the continuity
of reasons for action).
14. As noted below, the private right of action may also, on this theory, serve as a
substitute for acts of preventive justice taken by means of self-help. See infra notes 97-98 and
accompanying text. The argument in this Article is not bound to a corrective justice
understanding of private law remedies.
15. In Locke’s view, for example, there is an inalienable right to redress. See JOHN LOCKE,
THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 261, 265-66
(David Wootton ed., 1993); see also Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 735-37
(discussing how this idea may be understood to underlie the private right of action).
16. In this sense, private law is private, and it can be fairly described as neutral. See
Zipursky, Private Law, supra note 2, at 634 (noting how this area of law is private); id. at 65354 (assessing how this area of law can be considered neutral).
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justice in certain cases—the availability of suit often stems from the
wronged party’s right to bring about corrective justice through a
state-provided means. That said, the key to understanding private
law is to recognize that, even in these cases, the private right of
action is a means of exercising moral enforcement rights.
At the same time, the private right of action is not about the
wronged party’s right to act against another, or at least not as civil
recourse theorists conventionally understand it.17 Bringing suit
may, for some, be a way of seeking recourse, but the law is not
concerned with recourse as traditionally described.18 Moral enforcement implicates a different value from getting satisfaction. The
private right of action instead involves a legal power to use the
courts as a source of remedies based on a moral enforcement right—
for example, the right to bring about corrective or preventive
justice19—which is in turn based on a primary moral right—for
example, the right to contractual performance.20 So construed, the
private right of action is an avenue of enforcement, provided to
those individuals who may legitimately use coercion to accomplish
this end.
I will refer to the above understanding as a moral rights theory
of private law. Like the leading alternatives, this Article seeks to
develop an interpretation consistent with the internal point of view
of legal actors. The Article is therefore premised on a structure of

17. If “acting against” another is construed with sufficient breadth, it becomes possible
to view the theory of private law presented in this Article as a distinct form of civil recourse
theory. For discussion of this potential viewpoint, see Andrew S. Gold, The Taxonomy of Civil
Recourse, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). An important distinction is that the
theory described in this Article will often be concerned with the redress of wrongful losses, not
wrongs as such. Conventional civil recourse theory focuses on the redress of wrongs as such.
See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917
(2010) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs].
18. Or, ordinarily it is not. I leave open the possibility that this is exactly what punitive
damages accomplish. Cf. Sebok, supra note 2, at 1006-08.
19. Other types of justice might also be implicated. I will develop this possibility in a
future paper. See Andrew S. Gold, Redressive Justice (Feb. 4, 2011) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
20. To speak more precisely, we may say that the moral enforcement right is derived, at
least in part, from the reasons for action that support the wrongdoer’s primary duty. In a
corrective justice case, it may no longer be possible to perform the original obligation pursuant
to its terms; that obligation no longer exists. Cf. Gardner, supra note 13, at 45-46 (suggesting
how primary rights can be related to secondary rights on a “‘right-in, right-out’ principle”).
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rights, duties, wrongs, and remedies. Starting from this foundation,
the argument proceeds in several steps. Part I introduces the two
leading conceptual accounts of private law—corrective justice accounts and civil recourse accounts. Both of these accounts offer
important insights based on the concepts used in judicial reasoning,
and they provide background for the discussion to follow.
Part II explains the idea of moral rights and how it fits in with a
particular conception of interpersonal morality. This Part then develops the distinction between an individual’s primary moral rights
and an individual’s legitimate right to coerce compliance from
others—that is, an individual’s moral enforcement rights. This Part
also explains how ideas of standing are connected to these moral
enforcement rights.
Part III demonstrates how moral enforcement rights can be
linked to the private right of action. In many cases, the state
precludes individual actors from exercising self-help. Drawing on
social contract theory, this Part suggests that the state thus takes
on an obligation to provide an alternative means for individuals to
exercise their moral enforcement rights. The private right of action
is the means that the state has provided. This Part then explains
how a variety of private law remedies are understandable in these
terms. In addition, it shows how this interpretation of private law
improves on leading corrective justice and civil recourse accounts.
Part IV considers the normative implications of the moral rights
approach. Recently, legal theorists have critiqued the rationale of
existing law based on its perceived divergence from interpersonal
morality. For example, some argue that contract law diverges
undesirably from the morality of promising in light of the rationale
of contract law remedies.21 Such critiques generally overlook the role
of moral enforcement rights. By linking moral enforcement rights to
the private right of action, this Article suggests a different way to
understand these issues. As a result, we can better assess whether
private law is in need of reform. Finally, the Conclusion summarizes
the overall significance of a moral rights-based theory.

21. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 11, at 733-36.
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I. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND CIVIL RECOURSE
A. Interpretive Methodology
At the outset, a brief discussion of methodology may be helpful.
This Article offers an interpretive account of private law. There are
myriad ways to explain private law.22 Interpretive accounts focus on
rendering a legal practice intelligible. In other words, they “highlight[ ] its significance or meaning.”23 In order to do so, an interpretive approach calls on theorists to explain the law in a way that is
consistent with the internal point of view of legal actors.24 This
methodology has several implications.
Two standard criteria for a successful interpretation are fit and
coherence. In order to be convincing, an explanatory account must
show some degree of fit between the theory and the cases that the
theory seeks to explain.25 Otherwise, it is fair to say that the theory
is not actually interpreting private law as it actually exists.
Coherence is also a basic aim. Although coherence is by no means
guaranteed in a field developed over centuries by multitudes of
judges, it is reasonable to expect that legal principles will generally
hang together.26 Moreover, if private law is truly incoherent, it will
be quite difficult to render it intelligible.27 Some pluralism in the
law is no doubt inevitable. That said, an interpretive account
attempts to find a unifying principle that explains the core features
of a legal field.
The particular type of social practice at issue suggests additional
measures by which to assess a legal interpretation. Law is a purposive activity, and it is an activity that expressly relies on a variety
of concepts meaningful to legal actors.28 Given these facts, two
22. Cf. Joseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison,
in HART’S POSTSCRIPT 1, 10 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001) (“There is no uniquely correct explanation of a concept, nothing which could qualify as the explanation of the concept of law.”).
23. STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 5 (2004).
24. See id. at 14 (suggesting that “to understand the human practice of law, it is necessary
to take account of how law is understood from the inside—by legal actors”).
25. See id. at 7-11 (describing the fit criterion).
26. See id. at 11-13 (describing the coherence criterion).
27. See id. at 12-13 (discussing the interpretive concern with intelligibility).
28. Cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
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additional criteria are often proposed: a morality criterion and a
transparency criterion. Both are relevant when we consider theories
of private law.
The morality criterion suggests that a good interpretive account
of private law can be expressed in terms of conventional morality.29
This is not to say that an interpretation must show the law to
actually be moral.30 Instead, the concern is whether the law could at
least be viewed as moral by legal actors. The law’s self-understanding is that the law has authority—people ostensibly have a moral
duty to follow the law’s directives—and this claim of authority
makes most sense if the law is normatively within the mainstream.31 All else equal, an interpretation of the law that is morally
acceptable under conventional moral principles, or that judges could
at least sincerely think is morally acceptable, is more plausible than
an interpretation that shows a significant divergence between the
meaning of the law and established moral precepts.32
The transparency criterion is also an important factor. The law
is transparent to the extent that the reasons courts give for their
decisions are their actual reasons.33 One might interpret the law
without regard for judicial language, perhaps concluding that
judges are insincere in their express reasoning.34 Or, alternatively,
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 148 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., The Foundation Press, Inc. 1994) (1958) (“Law is a doing of something, a purposive
activity, a continuous striving to solve the basic problems of social living.”).
29. See SMITH, supra note 23, at 13-24 (describing the morality criterion).
30. One might hold such a view. For present purposes, a moderate version of the morality
criterion is adopted. Under this version, it is enough if legal actors could sincerely believe that
the law is consistent with morality. On the distinction, see id. at 13.
31. See id. at 15 (noting that “laws are understood, from the inside, as providing morally
good or justified reasons to do what the law requires”). This is not to say that law actually has
the authority it claims to have or is commonly thought to have. Cf. Laurence Claus, The
Empty Idea of Authority, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1301, 1302-06 (critiquing the idea that law as
such has authority).
32. See SMITH, supra note 23, at 15-24 (developing this point and offering a moderate
morality criterion for assessing interpretive accounts of the law).
33. See id. at 24-32 (analyzing this assumption); see also JULES L. COLEMAN, THE
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 21 (2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN, PRINCIPLE] (critiquing economic
explanations of tort law because they render “obvious and intuitively transparent features of
tort law mysterious and opaque”).
34. See SMITH, supra note 23, at 26 (“Particular instances of judges consciously misrepresenting their reasoning undoubtedly exist, but it is just not plausible to suppose that the
vast corpus of legal reasoning, which was created by countless individuals over centuries, is
IN THE
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one might think that judges operate under a delusion—deciding
cases on the basis of different reasons from the reasons they
themselves perceive.35 Both of these assumptions are accurate in
individual cases. But it is reasonable to think that most judges are
sincere in what they express in their opinions and relatively
accurate in setting forth the basis of their reasoning.36 The transparency criterion thus calls for an explanatory account that accepts the
reasons courts give as the actual basis for decision.
In some cases, it is appropriate to consider a further criterion.
Consilience can be important when more than one theory adequately fits the legal doctrine under review. Under the norm of
consilience, an explanatory account is better if, all else equal, it can
explain more legal phenomena than the alternatives.37 Consilience
is not always decisive in explaining legal phenomena. However, it
is relevant for present purposes. Even if prior interpretations of
private law are viewed as adequate in terms of fit, coherence,
morality, and transparency, I will suggest that this Article explains
more of the legal phenomena at issue than leading alternatives.
This brings us to a pragmatic question. It may still be asked why
we should desire an interpretive account—of what use is an account
that recognizes the internal point of view? Interpretation may be
interesting as an academic exercise, but perhaps it is unhelpful
when we assess how the law should be. However, there are good
reasons for developing such an account, even if one’s first priority
is normative.38 As Stephen A. Smith notes, “Before attempting to
all the result of a mass effort by judges to misrepresent what they are doing.”).
35. See id. at 28 (“[I]t seems implausible, in light of their training and sophistication, that
all or even many judges are in the grips of a collective false consciousness—and if it were
plausible, then it seems likely that legal theorists would be in the grip of similar forces.”).
36. See id. at 26.
37. See COLEMAN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 33, at 38-41 (discussing the role of consilience
for explanatory accounts). As will be elaborated below, one potential advantage of the account
in this Article over leading corrective justice accounts is that it explains a greater scope of
legal phenomena.
38. There are important critics of recent interpretive approaches to private law, however.
See, e.g., Steve Hedley, The Shock of the Old: Interpretivism in Obligations, in STRUCTURE AND
JUSTIFICATION IN PRIVATE LAW 205 (Charles Rickett & Ross Grantham eds., 2008) (discussing
the importance and effects of interpretivism); see also Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and
Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic
Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 326-36 (2007) (suggesting that Stephen Smith’s and Jules
Coleman’s reliance on a transparency criterion does not adequately take into account the
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reform the law, reformers must understand the law that they are
planning to reform.”39 Indeed, for some purposes, an account that
adopts the internal point of view is indispensable. In certain
contexts, we need to know what the law presently is. So long as
doctrines like stare decisis carry normative weight, it is important
to understand the concepts embedded in existing legal doctrine.40
Moreover, as will be developed later, an interpretive account allows
us to address normative theories that call for a correspondence between the law’s rationale and the tenets of interpersonal morality.41
In light of these considerations, this Article seeks to understand
private law concepts from the internal point of view. Legal theorists
have elaborated several criteria for the successful interpretation of
a legal practice, including fit, coherence, morality, transparency,
and consilience. Perfect compliance with each of these criteria may
not be feasible.42 That said, they provide important guidelines. This
Article seeks to reach an acceptable outcome under each of these
criteria.
B. The Bilateralism Challenge
Emphasizing the concepts used in judicial decision making causes
problems for certain explanatory accounts of private law. Assuming
that courts mean what they say, it is difficult to square core features
of private law with consequentialist interpretations of legal
doctrine.43 The reasoning of private law cases is, in core areas,
importance of determinacy). In addition, some have questioned the stringency of the fit
criterion as applied under certain interpretive approaches. See William Lucy, Method and Fit:
Two Problems for Contemporary Philosophies of Tort Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 605, 637-43 (2007).
39. See SMITH, supra note 23, at 6.
40. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457, 476-77
(2000) [hereinafter Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism].
41. See infra Part IV.
42. Cf. SMITH, supra note 23, at 13 (concluding, with respect to the coherence criterion,
that “a requirement of perfect unity seems not only unattainable in practice, but also
inappropriate in theory”).
43. It may be possible to adopt a transparency criterion while accepting a consequentialist
account of the underlying basis for a legal institution. The difficulty is in adopting a
consequentialist account of the legal reasoning expressed in judicial opinions. See COLEMAN,
PRINCIPLE, supra note 33, at 36 n.20 (suggesting that an economic account could explain tort
law “at the grand level of political theory”). It is true that occasionally judges are quite explicitly consequentialist in their reasoning. The question, however, is whether such reasoning
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deontological—private law reasoning is usually concerned with the
duties that one party owes to another as a result of their particular
interactions.44 The private law regularly invokes a backward-looking
analysis based on conduct that has already occurred.45
At the heart of private law is a conception of relational duties and
rights. A relational duty is a duty owed by an individual to persons
or classes of persons, in contrast to a general duty to simply act in
a certain way.46 A duty to keep a promise, for example, is specifically
owed to the promisee, and not to anyone else. A relational right is
similar. It is held against a person or class of persons. It is not a
general right that a certain outcome transpire, but a right that
exists with respect to a particular counterparty.
The recurrent appearance of relational rights and duties in
private law can be explained and justified in a variety of ways, but
the implications of these concepts pose difficulties for consequentialist accounts of private law. Remedies that redress violations of
relational rights and correspond to relational duties typically involve a bilateral structure—these remedies involve payments from
the wrongdoer to the wronged party.47 Consequentialist accounts,
such as efficiency-based accounts, do not require this bilateral
relationship. Indeed, such accounts could easily be in tension with
bilateral remedies.48
is characteristic of the practice being interpreted. Cf. id. at 26 n.3 (calling into doubt the
possibility that judges in the tort law setting aim at efficiency, although recognizing that some
individual judges are overtly interested in obtaining efficient results).
44. More precisely, private law is dikaiological—it involves relational rights and duties,
not merely duties as such. For analysis of this distinction, see Michael Thompson, What Is It
To Wrong Someone? A Puzzle About Justice, in REASON AND VALUE 333, 338 (R. Jay Wallace
et al. eds., 2004).
45. See COLEMAN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 33, at 16-18 (critiquing the “forward-looking”
aspects of economic accounts of tort law); Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, supra note 40,
at 462 (noting that the determination of liability involves a backward-looking analysis).
46. For an illuminating discussion of relational duties and their place in tort law, see John
C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of Macpherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733,
1825-39 (1998). It is also worth noting that, in many cases, the duties at stake are agentrelative rather than agent-neutral. On the idea of agent-relative norms, see DEREK PARFIT,
REASONS AND PERSONS 27 (1984). See also Robin Bradley Kar, Hart’s Response to Exclusive
Legal Positivism, 95 GEO. L.J. 393, 429 (2007), noting this feature of moral and legal
obligations.
47. This argument is well developed in COLEMAN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 33, at 16-18.
48. See Nathan B. Oman, The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract
Damages, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829, 851-53 (2007) (noting the challenge that overreliance
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This provides the basis of an argument known as the bilateralism
critique.49 Courts are apparently concerned with the idea that a
wrong has occurred between the parties to a dispute. Indeed, the
rights, duties, wrongs, and remedies in private law are all connected. Courts determine that a wrong occurred in light of the
parties’ relational rights and duties. Remedies, in turn, are provided
because a wrong was committed.50 The bilateral structure of private
law, in other words, is central to private law decision making. This
is a substantial challenge to an efficiency account that takes the
transparency of judicial opinions as a guideline.51 Efficiency accounts can explain this bilateral structure, but they treat it as a
contingent legal feature rather than a fundamental component of
private law reasoning.52
As developed below, corrective justice accounts are a leading
response to the bilateralism of private law. They suggest that the
payment of damages from the wrongdoer to the wronged party is a
correction of the wrong committed. Civil recourse theories are a
more recent alternative approach, and they are similarly effective.
They suggest that the payment of damages from the wrongdoer to
the wronged party is part of a system under which the wronged
party is empowered to act against the wrongdoer. Both accounts
take seriously the relational rights and duties at issue in private
law disputes. The strengths and weaknesses of these approaches
will be discussed in turn.

poses for economic accounts of contract remedies).
49. See COLEMAN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 33, at 18 n.7 (describing the history of this
critique).
50. See SMITH, supra note 23, at 31 (noting that, under the legal view, damages are
“intended to remedy a past harm”).
51. The extent to which the transparency of judicial opinions should be assumed is still
an open question. There are arguments for rejecting a transparency criterion as currently
applied. See Kraus, supra note 38, at 326-36; Oman, supra note 48, at 846-50. If, however, one
concludes that transparency is an appropriate assumption when interpreting private law,
then consequentialist accounts face a serious hurdle. See SMITH, supra note 23, at 31
(developing this point in the contract law setting).
52. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 701-09 (analyzing the contingency of
bilateralism under an efficiency account).
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C. Corrective Justice Theories
Corrective justice is a longstanding theme in private law,53 and it
offers an intuitively appealing explanation of the relational rights
and duties, wrongs, and remedies in private law. This form of justice
seeks to correct wrongs committed by A against B by requiring A to
compensate B in the amount of B’s loss.54 In cases where A possesses something which belongs to B, corrective justice would
require A to restore that thing or its equivalent to B. For example,
if A stole property from B, corrective justice would require the
return of the property to B or its equivalent in value.
Liability under a corrective justice approach views the parties as
correlatively situated—the plaintiff and defendant have corresponding rights and duties.55 The plaintiff is entitled to the right that the
defendant infringed upon and therefore has a corresponding entitlement to a remedy that restores what was lost or its value.56
Likewise, the defendant has a duty not to infringe upon the plaintiff’s right and has a corresponding duty to undo the injury he
caused.57 The judicial remedy reflects this interpersonal relation.
Indeed, the judicial remedy is often thought to constitute corrective
justice and not solely to help attain it.58
Moreover, the normative appeal of corrective justice is easy to
recognize in a variety of tort and contracts cases.59 Making a
53. See WEINRIB, supra note 1, at 56 (“Aristotle’s account of corrective justice is the
earliest—and in many respects, still the definitive—description of the form of the private law
relationship.”).
54. See id. at 62 (“[Corrective justice] focuses on a quantity that represents what rightfully belongs to one party but is now wrongly possessed by another party and therefore
must be shifted back to its rightful owner.”). The classic development of this idea is in
V ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 153-57 (J.E.C. Welldon trans., Prometheus Books
1987).
55. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.KENT L. REV. 55, 59 (2003).
56. See id. at 60.
57. See id.
58. See Gardner, supra note 13, at 2 (“Corrective justice is a special kind of justice that,
according to Weinrib, the law of torts helps to constitute, and not merely to serve.”).
59. It should also be noted that there are some cases in which a corrective justice rubric
may be questioned on normative grounds. In particular, commentators focus on cases in which
correcting a wrong would restore a distributively unjust status quo. See Solomon, supra note
2, at 1774-75 (discussing this concern).
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wronged party whole appeals to a basic principle of conventional
morality. When one person wrongs another, the wrongdoer ordinarily takes on a moral duty to remedy that wrong.60 Corrective
justice accounts often build on this idea. On this view, private law
remedies are premised on the wrongdoer’s responsibility for correcting the wrong he or she committed.61 The private law may not
always succeed in erasing the effects of a wrongful act.62 Nevertheless, it can offer the next best thing.
When we review the content of certain private law remedies,
there is also a good fit with legal doctrine. Many standard legal
remedies are designed to make the claimant whole.63 Compensatory
damages in tort law and expectation damages in contract law can
both be understood in terms of corrective justice.64 Arguably,
restitutionary remedies are corrective as well.65 And, even when
compensation falls short of fully repairing an injury, compensatory
damages may still be understood as an effort to correct.66 Remedies
that correct a wrong are not the only remedies available in private
law, but they are core examples.67
Endorsing a corrective justice rubric does not resolve all of the
controversial issues in private law.68 Corrective justice has a major
explanatory advantage over its consequentialist rivals, however. It
is one of the few explanations of private law that can adequately account for the bilateralism of private law rights, duties, and reme-

60. See Gardner, supra note 13, at 28-37 (analyzing this feature of morality).
61. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 1, at 374 (describing tort law in terms
of an injurer’s duty to make good a loss).
62. Indeed, even a perfectly crafted corrective remedy cannot change the fact that a wrong
was committed in the first place. See Gardner, supra note 13, at 35-36 (discussing this issue).
63. See, e.g., infra note 201 and accompanying discussion (discussing the compensatory
remedy in tort law that makes a claimant whole).
64. See, e.g., COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 1, ch. 18 (tort law); Gold, supra
note 1, at 46 (contract law).
65. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Correctively Unjust Enrichment, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 31, 31 (Robert Chambers et al. eds., 2009).
66. See Gardner, supra note 13, at 33-34.
67. See infra note 202 and accompanying discussion.
68. Notably, this type of theory does not identify which primary rights and duties private
law will recognize. See SMITH, supra note 23, at 147 (“Corrective justice is meant to explain
(secondary) duties to repair rather than (primary) duties not to cause wrongful losses.
Primary duties must be explained on other grounds.”).
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dies.69 Efficiency-based accounts sometimes suggest that the bilateralism of private law is a second-best approach, given various
institutional constraints on private law.70 These claims may be
accurate from an economic standpoint, but they do not address the
conceptual problem. Corrective justice accounts can explain bilateralism as a core feature of private law doctrine.
At first glance then, corrective justice may seem like a convincing
way to explain private law concepts of right, duty, wrong, and
remedy. Unfortunately, corrective justice accounts suffer from their
own set of explanatory weaknesses—weaknesses that the civil
recourse theory brings into focus.
D. Civil Recourse Theories
Like corrective justice accounts, civil recourse accounts build on
relational rights and duties, wrongs, and remedies. A civil recourse
theory argues that private law fields are best understood in terms
of the plaintiff’s right to redress through the courts when the
plaintiff was legally wronged by another individual.71 But the focus
of a recourse-based approach is not upon whether the law corrects
a wrong (or wrongful loss) by making the victim whole. Instead, civil
recourse theorists suggest that the law enables a wronged party to
have a proportional response to a wrong.72 As Benjamin Zipursky,
a leading recourse theorist, explains, “By recognizing a legal right
of action against a tortfeasor, our system respects the principle that
the plaintiff is entitled to act against one who has legally wronged
him or her.”73
Under this account, the structure of the private right of action is
a core feature of private law.74 Significantly, the private right of
action involves three parties, not two. It involves a relation between

69. For a detailed account of how economic explanations struggle to explain bilateralism
in a way that corrective justice does not, see COLEMAN, PRINCIPLE, supra note 33, at 13-24.
70. Cf. Oman, supra note 48, at 858 (analyzing this possibility as an explanation for the
bilateralism in contract law).
71. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 746-47.
72. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
73. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 735 (emphasis added).
74. See id. at 733-34, 738.
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the party who was wronged, the state, and the wrongdoer.75 Private
rights of action implicate a legal power held by the plaintiff—a
power to initiate the state’s response to the defendant’s wrongdoing.76 The state’s role is thus contingent. But for the plaintiff ’s
decision to sue, the state will play no role in providing redress for
the wrong committed against the plaintiff.
For civil recourse theory, the private right of action gives us
insight into the nature of private law reasoning.77 From this perspective, the aim of private law is not necessarily to make the
plaintiff whole.78 If it were, we might expect the state to intervene
of its own accord, as occurs in the criminal law setting.79 Instead,
private rights of action are a constant feature of private law adjudication.80 Corrective justice approaches, at least in some cases,
are not well-suited to explain why private law should be so focused
on private rights of action. If private law is understood as a means
for civil recourse, this structure is readily explained.
Corrective justice accounts may also have difficulty explaining the
substantive standing requirements of private law.81 The private
right of action is not available to just anyone who wishes to bring
suit. Under the typical common law approach, it is only the wronged
party who is in a position to initiate a private right of action.82 A
plaintiff must have had her rights violated by the defendant in order
to bring suit—merely suffering foreseeable harm is not necessarily
enough to provide standing.83 This structure places the wronged

75. See id. at 738-39.
76. For a detailed discussion of this structural feature, see id. at 733-39.
77. See id. at 738 (“[W]e may understand [certain tort law] principles as instances of a
more general principle that one who has been legally wronged is entitled to a private right of
action against the wrongdoer.”).
78. See id. at 737.
79. Cf. Solomon, supra note 2, at 1800 (“[I]f tort law is about restoring the moral order in
some sense, then perhaps the state should enforce this moral order itself.”).
80. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 737-38.
81. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 1800; Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 714-16
(analyzing the substantive standing rule in tort law); Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse,
supra note 2, at 40-42, 72-79 (same).
82. See Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 2, at 15-40 (describing a
variety of tort law doctrines that share this feature).
83. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 717-18.
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party at the center of the private action in a way that need not
follow from a corrective justice premise.84
In addition, corrective justice accounts often focus on the wrongdoer’s remedial duty to correct the wrong he or she committed.85
This raises a fit objection to the extent that corrective justice theory
grounds private law on this remedial duty. Private law—in particular the law of torts—frequently fails to provide judicial remedies for
a wrongdoer’s failure to pay compensatory damages until a court
orders such damages.86 According to the recourse theorists, this
omission suggests that tort law is not premised on corrective justice
norms.87 Presumably, if compensatory damages were grounded in a
duty to correct a wrong, such damages, at least in cases of intentional delay, would be a matter of course.88
Finally, civil recourse accounts allege that the variety of remedies
available through the private right of action conflicts with corrective
justice theories.89 Injunctive relief and punitive damages are good
examples. At least in some cases, the law does not make a wronged
party whole, and in other cases, it seems to be providing additional
forms of compensation beyond what corrective justice would require.
This is especially clear in the case of injunctive relief—there is not
yet a wrong to correct when a court issues an injunction against
future wrongdoing.90
The civil recourse perspective explains many of these features.
For one thing, it explains private law’s substantive standing requirements. Civil recourse proponents argue that the apparent aim
of private law is to enable the plaintiff to act against the party who
wronged her.91 This explains why the private right of action is not
84. For a discussion of corrective justice theories that do try to explain this feature, see
infra note 183.
85. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 697-98.
86. There are, however, cases in which prejudgment interest is awarded. In addition,
there are important areas of private law outside of tort law that more clearly suggest a
prejudgment duty to pay. See infra note 210 for further discussion of this issue.
87. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 718-21.
88. For further discussion of this claim, see infra note 210.
89. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 710-13.
90. See id. at 713 (noting that injunctive relief cases “are not cases of defendants taking
responsibility for the harm they have caused”). This argument depends, of course, on the view
that corrective justice is solely concerned with ex post responses to wrongs or harms.
91. See Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 2, at 86.
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available to redress an individual’s foreseeable losses that result
from wrongs committed against a third party.92 The value of acting
against another is, naturally, specific to the person who was
wronged.93
The state’s role in this process is also explained. Recourse theorists argue that enabling a wronged party to act against the party
who wronged her can be normatively desirable,94 or at least that
such an understanding is a plausible interpretation of the private
law perspective.95 The individual’s power to act against a wrongdoer
by means of the state can then be understood as something that the
state is obligated to provide.96 The private right of action on this
account is a substitute for the right of self-help that would otherwise
exist in a state of nature.97 Under this theory, the right of recourse
is a right retained by individuals when they are the victims of
wrongdoing.98
From a pragmatic perspective, it is easy to see why the state
prohibits self-help in the setting of the typical private law dispute.
Self-help could easily escalate into feuds and bloodshed.99 The right
92. See id. at 89.
93. See id. at 87 (“The answer is that entitlement to recourse does not spring from the
need precipitated by injury. It springs from the affront of being wronged by another.”).
94. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 1807 (suggesting, in support of a civil recourse account,
that “[t]ort law, and the accountability it enforces, affirms that our activities and our life
plans are ours, and that we must answer for the harm that comes from them if we take
insufficient care”).
95. It is clear that some recourse theorists do not intend for their arguments to provide
a full-fledged normative defense of civil recourse. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2,
at 750 (“My aim is not to defend the vindictive impulses that I have been describing.”); id. at
755 (emphasizing that the aim in his article is “interpretive and not normative”).
96. See id. at 739 (“The right of action—insofar as it is correlative to a duty—is correlative
to an obligation in the state to privilege and empower persons to act against those who have
wronged them.”).
97. See, e.g., id. at 735-37 (describing how acting through the state against the person who
has legally wronged you can be understood in social contract terms); Zipursky, Rights,
Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 2, at 85-86 (same).
98. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 746-47.
99. See Goldberg, supra note 2, at 602 (“Because it is unmediated, vengeance runs high
risks of error, overkill, additional violence, and ongoing feuds, which tend to work against the
resolution of disputes and to undermine civil order.”); Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse,
supra note 2, at 85 (noting that, under a civil recourse approach, “[o]ur society ... avoids the
mayhem and crudeness of vengeful private retribution, but without the unfairness of leaving
individuals powerless against invasions of their rights”); cf. Solomon, supra note 2, at 1781
(discussing and critiquing this argument).
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to recourse, however, can be exercised through a more civil, stateprovided avenue: the private right of action.100 Civil recourse theories suggest that the private right of action is an entitlement that
the state is bound to provide.101 On this view, courts provide private
rights of action as a rightful avenue of recourse, one that the
plaintiff deserves to have.102
An important difficulty with the recourse approach is that it at
least appears to endorse a natural right to revenge.103 It seems
unlikely that the majority of courts understand private rights of
action in terms of revenge. Not all civil recourse proponents support
a revenge-based reading: recourse may simply refer to holding
someone accountable, or getting “satisfaction.”104 Nevertheless, even
so construed, recourse implicates a vindictive impulse that is quite
controversial.105 And, assuming that recourse, whether construed as
revenge or as getting satisfaction, is appropriate in certain cases, it
remains doubtful whether the typical breached contract or negligence action would be a suitable fact pattern to support such a
norm.106 Civil recourse accounts do an admirable job of fitting
100. See Zipursky, Private Law, supra note 2, at 642.
101. See id. (“[T]he state—having deprived individuals of other means of self-help—is
obligated to empower individuals with an avenue of civil recourse through the courts.”).
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 2, at 55-58 (critiquing
civil recourse accounts on the theory that they treat as worthy the impulse to get even); see
also Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1406-13 (2003)
(concluding that retributive actions may be justifiable, but critiquing acts of private revenge).
That said, revenge also has its proponents. See, e.g., PETER A. FRENCH, THE VIRTUES OF
VENGEANCE 89-91 (2001); see also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, GETTING EVEN 17-26 (2003)
(suggesting vindictive behavior is not always irrational or immoral).
104. Cf. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1162 (2007) (describing tort victims who have been “injured in a way
that warrants their thinking that someone else is responsible for mistreating them and that
their wrongdoer is an appropriate person from whom to demand redress or satisfaction”).
105. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 1779-84 (assessing this concern).
106. Notably, some civil recourse theorists may reject the idea that contract law is best
explained in civil recourse terms. Cf. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 719-20
(distinguishing contract law from tort law in terms of duties to pay prior to a court judgment).
Segregating contract law in this way would avoid a fit objection. This move raises a different
problem, however. Why should we not pursue a theory of private law that can explain both
tort law and contract law, not to mention other subfields such as unjust enrichment? Civil
recourse theorists have criticized those corrective justice theorists who would lop off punitive
damages when explaining tort law, see id. at 712-13, but a variation on this critique may

2011]

A MORAL RIGHTS THEORY OF PRIVATE LAW

1895

certain structural features of private law—private actions and
substantive standing requirements—but they raise doubts on the
normative side.107
In addition, civil recourse accounts do a poor job of explaining
why it is that the law so frequently does provide remedies that are
corrective of wrongs, or more precisely, wrongful losses. Why should
“getting satisfaction” for the affront of being wronged by a negligent
act have such a predictable, corrective outcome: compensation designed to make the victim whole? Why do contracts cases so frequently result in expectation damages? Private law remedies are
not always corrective in their nature, but statistically speaking,
they certainly show a corrective pattern.108
E. Summary
In different ways, the corrective justice approach and the civil
recourse approach both respond to the structure of rights, duties,
wrongs, and remedies that runs throughout private law. In each
case, the primary rights of the plaintiff are seen to correspond to the
primary duties of the defendant, and in cases in which these rights
have been violated, courts recognize that a wrong has occurred. At
this point, however, the two theories part ways. The nature and, to
some extent, the basis of judicially provided remedies are quite different for each theory.
For some time, these two approaches have been the leading explanations of private law that build on the internal point of view. Yet
the two accounts are very much at odds. Critics of corrective justice
theories question whether such theories have adequately addressed
apply to those civil recourse theorists who would divide tort law from contract law. Arguably,
private law should be viewed as a whole.
107. While recognizing their plausibility, Jason Solomon has recently attempted to allay
the normative doubts about recourse theory. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 1779-80. Solomon
provides an important contribution to this debate, but there is insufficient space here to
discuss the nuances of his argument. That said, for reasons similar to those that challenge
other recourse theories, it is questionable whether the notion of recourse Solomon describes
can be squared with the internal point of view of legal actors.
108. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. The issue is particularly salient in the
contract law setting, where loss-correcting remedies are available on a strict liability basis.
Cf. Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict Liability with Corrective Justice in Contract Law,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3013 (2007).
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the private right of action and its substantive standing requirements.109 Critics of civil recourse theories question the normative
premises of a recourse-based system.110 This Article will offer an
alternative. Individuals have moral enforcement rights when they
are wronged or, in some cases, when they are likely to be wronged.
I will argue that it is these moral enforcement rights that lie at the
heart of private law.
II. THE MORAL RIGHTS APPROACH EXPLAINED
The thesis of this Article is that private law is grounded in a
wronged party’s moral enforcement rights. In order to better explain
the concepts at issue, this Part will begin with a brief foray into
recent work in moral philosophy. A specific kind of moral reasoning
is at stake here. In essence, the entitlements that dominate private
law decision making involve the “second-person” standpoint. This
standpoint offers a particular way of thinking about our obligations
with reference to what we owe to one another. It is not the same
kind of reasoning that we use if we take a utilitarian approach to
social policy. Second-personal reasoning calls for a distinct, authority-based approach to moral questions.
In a recent book, the philosopher Stephen Darwall has explained
what the second-person standpoint means.111 It is a standpoint that
requires us to think in terms of a particular kind of interpersonal
relationship, one that is bilateral. When we are assessing reasons
for action, second-personal reasons call for an understanding of
what one person can claim from another.112 Thus, “[a] secondpersonal reason is one whose validity depends on presupposed
authority and accountability relations between persons and,
therefore, on the possibility of the reason’s being addressed personto-person.”113 Its implications are linked to the specific individuals

109. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
111. See generally STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT (2006).
112. See id. at 4 (“What makes a reason second-personal is that it is grounded in (de jure)
authority relations that an addresser takes to hold between him and his addressee.”).
113. Id. at 8.
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involved—one person may be able to claim something from another
when a third person would lack the authority to do so.114
The contrast between second-personal reasoning and other moral
perspectives can be significant, most notably due to the secondperson standpoint’s agent-relative implications.115 First-personal
moral reasoning is the kind of practical reasoning we engage in as
individuals when determining how we should act.116 Third-personal
reasoning is the type of practical reasoning concerned with states of
the world—it is outcome focused and agent-neutral.117 Secondpersonal reasoning is the kind of practical reasoning we engage in
when figuring out what we owe to another person and, relatedly,
what that other person can demand from us.118
To use Darwall’s hypothetical, imagine a case in which one person
wrongfully steps on your foot.119 You might argue to this individual
that the world would be a better one if unconsented foot stompings
did not occur, given the pain they cause.120 Presumably, you could
make a convincing case in favor of your argument. However, you
might instead demand that the wrongdoer stop stepping on your
foot, speaking either as the victim or as a member of the moral
community whose members do not treat each other in this way. This
demand would give the wrongdoer a different kind of reason to cease
his activity.121
This latter second-personal reason for the wrongdoer to cease
is an agent-relative reason. As Darwall suggests, “If [the person
stepping on your foot] could stop, say, two others from causing
gratuitous pain by the shocking spectacle of keeping his foot firmly
planted on yours, this second, claim-based (hence second-personal)
reason would not recommend that he do so.”122 The second-personal
114. See id. at 7 (noting how second-personal reasons are agent-relative).
115. See id. at 7-8.
116. See Kar, supra note 46, at 426.
117. See DARWALL, supra note 111, at 9-10 (“What the second-person stance excludes is the
third-person perspective, that is, regarding, for practical purposes, others (and oneself), not
in relation to oneself, but as they are (or one is) ‘objectively’ or ‘agent-neutrally’ (including as
related to the person one is).”).
118. See id. at 8 (defining second-personal reasons).
119. See id. at 5.
120. See id. at 5-7 (discussing this type of reasoning).
121. See id. at 7 (discussing this type of demand).
122. See id.
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reason for action is thus very different from a standard consequentialist reason. The victim’s argument involves an address to the
foot stomper as the specific individual who is responsible for the
conduct at issue.
As will become evident, this type of moral reasoning can shed
light on legal obligations. The rights, duties, wrongs, and remedies
that run throughout private law are a match for the type of moral
reasoning we see from the second-person standpoint.123 Legal rights,
duties, and causes of action all implicate personal authority and
accountability. Before proceeding to consider the legal structure of
rights and duties, however, we will want to first review a particular
moral concept, the concept of a moral right.
A. The Link Between Moral Rights and Private Enforcement
Moral rights are a classic example of a second-personal concept,
and they are central to the present interpretation of private law.124
Given the ambiguities in the phrase “moral rights,” some elaboration is required. The relation between contract law and promising
is helpful for these purposes, as it allows for the demonstration of
several key distinctions respecting moral rights. Accordingly, Part
II.A will review several promise-related fact patterns. The argument
developed here is not limited to these settings, but it is usefully
illustrated by them.
As will be developed, some moral rights are legitimately open to
enforcement, but others are suited, at most, to a demand that the
duty holder comply with his or her duties.125 Moreover, appropriate
responses to a breach vary among different actors. Legitimate verbal responses to a breach of moral rights, such as denunciation,
implicate the standing we all have as members of the moral commu123. Cf. Kar, supra note 46, at 438-47 (indicating that the second-person standpoint offers
a way to understand both moral and legal obligations).
124. For a discussion of how claim rights fit into second-person moral reasoning, see
DARWALL, supra note 111, at 18-20. Most importantly, a right in this sense “includes a secondpersonal authority to resist, complain, remonstrate, and perhaps use coercive measures of
other kinds, including, perhaps, to gain compensation if the right is violated.” Id. at 18
(emphasis added).
125. Cf. Peter Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of Justification for Contract, 33 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 273, 293 (1995) (discussing the importance of enforceable rights with respect to
contract law).
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nity, but other responses, such as coercion, may implicate the
special standing of the right holder alone.126 To the extent a coercive
response to the infringement of a right is legitimate, different
individuals may have different standing to respond.127
These distinctions will become relevant when we return to the
subject of private law later in this Article. They suggest an important parallel between moral and legal reasoning. The moral rights
that private parties are justified in enforcing in a state of nature are
the type of moral rights that the law generally permits them to
enforce by means of the private right of action.128 And a plaintiff ’s
standing to initiate a private right of action is, for the most part,
reflective of that individual’s standing to enforce her moral rights
outside the legal sphere.129 A review of common intuitions regarding
moral rights will thus set the stage for our subsequent interpretation of private law.
1. Moral Rights Defined
Moral rights for purposes of this Article exist in those cases in
which an individual has a legitimate claim to something and one or
more other individuals have a moral duty corresponding to the right
holder’s claim. In this sense, moral rights are analogous to the legal
idea of a claim right.130 Such rights involve more than a mere
interest in an outcome; they are relational rights that correspond to
the duties of others.131
The next question concerns enforcement. Assuming moral rights
exist in a particular case, what is the significance of a moral rights
violation? The enforcement implications of moral rights were
126. See H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 178 (1955).
127. See id.
128. See infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text.
129. See infra Part III.
130. The classic discussion of legal claim rights—and privileges, powers, and immunities—
is found in Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
131. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. One could also argue for moral rights
that do not correspond to a duty of any particular person. For a recent discussion of such
arguments, see Ronen Perry, Correlativity, 28 LAW & PHIL. 537 (2009). This possibility,
although theoretically interesting, is not generally relevant to the private law issues discussed
in this Article.
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famously elaborated by H.L.A. Hart in his article Are There Any
Natural Rights?132 As Hart recognized, moral rights are closely tied
to legal rights. According to Hart, “the concept of a right belongs to
that branch of morality which is specifically concerned to determine
when one person’s freedom may be limited by another’s and so to
determine what actions may appropriately be made the subject of
coercive legal rules.”133
A key feature is that moral rights, when present, are consistent
with a legitimate use of coercion to make rights violators comply. As
Hart explains:
The most important common characteristic of this group of
moral concepts is that there is no incongruity, but a special
congruity in the use of force or the threat of force to secure that
what is just or fair or someone’s right to have done shall in fact
be done; for it is in just these circumstances that coercion of
another human being is legitimate.134

This point is not just about legal enforcement, however. Moral
rights are potentially consistent with self-help. Hart suggests that
it is “a very important feature of a moral right that the possessor of
it is conceived as having a moral justification for limiting the
freedom of another.”135
For present purposes, our concern is with the moral legitimacy of
coercing compliance through physical force. Some moral rights have
a congruity with the use of force or the threat of force.136 In these
cases, force means something more than a rebuke or denunciation.
Other moral rights are considered inconsistent with this forceful
type of response.137 This distinction will matter when we assess
private law. Moral rights that have a congruity with the use of force

132. See Hart, supra note 126, at 175-91.
133. Id. at 177.
134. Id. at 178.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. A good example of this latter category of moral right is an ordinary promise with no
reliance or consideration involved. It is commonly thought that the promisee has a moral right
to performance but that coercion would be inappropriate if the promisor breaks the promise.
See Gold, supra note 1, at 20 n.95.
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or the threat of force—beyond a mere demand for compliance or a
rebuke—are the focus of this Article.
For clarity, I will refer to cases in which a breach of a primary
moral right would support a demand or rebuke, and nothing more,
as cases involving a weak moral right.138 On the other hand, I will
refer to cases in which a breach would support the use of force or the
threat of force as cases involving a strong moral right.139 In each
instance, the content of the primary moral right may be the
same—for example, the performance of a promise—but the enforcement implications of a wrongdoer’s failure to act consistently with
his corresponding duty would be different.
2. Moral Enforcement Rights as a Distinct Category
When do moral rights support the use of force if a wrongdoer has
violated their terms? That is, when are they strong moral rights?
This can be a difficult normative question, one which varies
considerably from one context to another—for example, harm to
property, physical injury to a person, and violation of promises.140
That said, certain cases are both recognizable and intuitively
plausible examples of situations in which individuals acquire or
possess strong moral rights. Promises offer a helpful illustration of
how such distinctions respecting the legitimate use of force may
arise.
Consider an ordinary promise, one without preconditions and
without reliance. Suppose X promises to have lunch with Y and then
138. I have discussed this distinction in previous work. See Andrew S. Gold, Consideration
and the Morality of Promising, in EXPLORING CONTRACT LAW 115, 127 (Jason W. Neyers et al.
eds., 2009). As noted in that paper, it offers a potential justification in promissory morality
for the doctrine of consideration. For a similar categorization of rights, see ADAM SMITH,
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 9, in V THE GLASGOW EDITION OF THE WORKS AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF ADAM SMITH (R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael, & P.G. Stein eds., Liberty Fund
1982) (1762) (distinguishing “perfect” and “imperfect” rights).
139. See Gold, supra note 138, at 127.
140. The most clear-cut cases implicating strong moral rights involve bodily injury. More
difficult questions are raised by encroachments on property or violations of agreements. It
would require at least one separate paper to analyze what features of these fact patterns
account for the existence of a strong moral right in those cases in which such rights exist. I
would hypothesize, however, that conceptions of ownership play a central role in explaining
the more difficult cases. For analysis of how ownership-related concepts contribute in the
contractual sphere, see generally Gold, supra note 1.

1902

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1873

five minutes later tells Y she has changed her mind. In such a case,
one may not coerce a promisor to keep her word except to the extent
that we count making a rebuke as a type of coercion.141 It would not
strike most of us as a legitimate response for an individual to
forcibly make a promisor keep her word in this case, even granting
that the promise is morally binding. The reason for this is not based
in law but in morality. The primary moral right to performance and
the remedial moral right to performance or its equivalent do not
correspond to a legitimate use of physical force by the promisee to
make sure that the promise is kept or that an appropriate remedy
is provided.
For other promises, the situation is different. As I have argued in
prior work, when a promisee meets the terms of a conditional promise, the promisee is now in a position to claim ownership of the
promised performance.142 Based on the labor and effort expended,
the promisee is in a different situation with respect to the promise
in such cases. Under these conditions, the promise results in a
strong moral right.
For example, imagine the hypothetical case from the Introduction
to this Article. B labors for hours to build A’s house with the
understanding that this labor will trigger a promissory obligation
on the part of A—A will now owe performance, the act of providing
B with a table, in light of B’s hours of effort. Given her efforts, B can
claim ownership of the promised performance: the transfer of the
table. She may even take the table if A is unwilling to provide it to
her. Because of her efforts to meet the terms of the agreement, B is
not in the position of an ordinary promisee—coercive enforcement
is now legitimate.
All else equal, a promisee’s claim to the promised performance in
such cases is sufficiently strong that the promisee deserves to be
able to make the promisor keep his word, or at least deserves to be
able to make the promisor provide a monetary equivalent in

141. For a suggestion that such a rebuke is a type of authoritative pressure, see Margaret
Gilbert, Scanlon on Promissory Obligation: The Problem of Promisees’ Rights, 101 J. PHIL. 83,
89 (2004) [hereinafter Gilbert, Scanlon on Promissory Obligation].
142. See generally Gold, supra note 1.
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damages.143 The promisor’s future action—performance—now
belongs to the promisee.
People may not agree that coercion is plausible for every individual case of promissory obligations. Sometimes coercion would be
unjust. However, under the right circumstances, many would find
that promises can have this feature—to wit, the promisee is justified
in using coercion to enforce the promise’s terms.
I will refer to this right to bring about a coercive remedy as a
“moral enforcement right.”144 It is not hard to think of similar
examples outside the contractual sphere. Moral enforcement rights
arise in a variety of contexts. If A steals a piece of property from B,
B would possess a moral enforcement right with respect to that
property. Within limits, she would be able to legitimately use force
to retake the property or, if it is no longer available, to coerce A to
pay the monetary equivalent. As these examples suggest, moral
enforcement rights plausibly arise in a sizable subset of moral rights
cases.
3. Moral Enforcement Rights and a Claimant’s Standing
The next salient feature of moral rights involves the wronged
party’s standing. It is one thing to determine that a breach of a
moral right supports a coercive response. It is a separate question
to determine whether any particular individual has a right to
engage in this coercive response. Even when a primary moral right
is so significant that its violation will legitimize coercive enforce143. Note that the present account should also be reconcilable with the type of contract
theory developed by Stephen Smith. See Stephen A. Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, in
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE, FOURTH SERIES 107 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000). Smith
rejects the idea that contracts could be grounded in a transfer of preexisting ownership
interests in performance (contrary to my own view), yet concludes that contracts do involve
the creation of a property-like interest in the promised performance.
144. For purposes of this Article, I will use the terminology “moral enforcement right.” It
is arguable that this moral relationship involves a “privilege” or “liberty,” to use Hohfeld’s
terminology. See Hohfeld, supra note 130, at 32-36. However, the moral relationship in this
case includes the idea that the wrongdoer may not interfere with the exercise of the privilege.
Hohfeld describes privileges such that interference may, in some cases, be permissible. See
id. at 35. For a helpful analysis of this type of distinction, see H.L.A. HART, Legal Rights, in
ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 162, 171 (1982). See also Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of
Property, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 69, 80-82 (2005) (using the language of rights to address
conduct that corresponds to a duty of noninterference).
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ment, it need not follow that any particular individual will possess
a moral enforcement right. Only certain individuals (if any) may
have the standing to coerce.
Darwall’s insights are helpful in setting forth this feature of
interpersonal morality. Recall that second-person moral reasoning
is focused on authority relations between one person and another.145
Darwall carefully separates the idea that someone should act in a
particular way from the idea that standing exists to call on an
individual to act in this way. As he notes, there is “a general
difference between there being normative reasons of whatever
weight or priority for us to do something—its being what we ought
to or must do—and anyone’s having any authority to claim or demand that we do it.”146
Generally speaking, all of us have the authority to demand that
a wrongdoer comply with a particular remedial moral duty.147 We
are all plausibly able to call on others to do the right thing, although
etiquette or tact may sometimes counsel restraint.148 When it comes
to claim rights, however, moral practices distinguish the secondperson standing of a right holder from the standing of a member of
the moral community. As Darwall notes,
In addition to there being weighty reasons against others
stepping on your feet, indeed, in addition to members of the
moral community having the standing to demand that people
not step on your feet, if you have a right, then you have a
standing to make a special demand against people who might
step on your feet—you have the authority to resist, claim
compensation, and so on.149
145. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
146. See DARWALL, supra note 111, at 14.
147. See id. at 20 (“Just as a right involves an authority to claim that to which one has a
right, so also is moral obligation conceptually tied to what the moral community can demand
(and what no one has a right not to do).”).
148. It should be noted that not all theorists would agree that standing is so universal. For
example, Margaret Gilbert has questioned whether we each have standing simply as human
beings to demand moral conduct of each other. That said, like Darwall, Gilbert argues that
a special standing exists when a party owes something to the right holder. See MARGARET
GILBERT, A THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 162 (2006) [hereinafter GILBERT, POLITICAL
OBLIGATION].
149. DARWALL, supra note 111, at 18. A similar point is expressed in Stephen Darwall, Law
and the Second-Person Standpoint, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 891, 892 (2007) (indicating that the
holder of a moral claim right could demand compensation if the duty holder does not perform,
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In many cases, the right holder has a special standing—an individual authority—to demand compliance from the obligor or, perhaps,
to claim compensation.
A good example of a moral right holder’s special standing to
respond to a breach appears in promissory morality. Margaret
Gilbert offers a nice illustration of this moral viewpoint. Gilbert
offers the example of a promise that she makes to the reader. As she
indicates, “If I were to allow that I owe you performance, then I
would recognize that you have the standing to upbraid me for
nonperformance, or to insist on performance. Before the fact you
could pressure me, saying in effect: ‘Give me that! It’s mine!’”150
Notice, however, that people’s intuitions about standing commonly
change when a bystander enters the picture. As Gilbert suggests,
It is true that a bystander could say, “Give her that! It’s hers!”
The case in which I command you to give me what is mine is
special, however. The bystander’s standing to command you to
give it to me can be questioned. My standing surely cannot be
questioned. In the bystander’s case, the riposte “It’s none of your
business!” makes sense. In my case, it does not.151

For a number of promises, no private individual can rightly force
performance. Only some promises are legitimately enforceable.
Assuming that forced performance, or forced compensation, is
morally legitimate in the case of a particular promise, however, the
idea that right holders possess a special standing is intuitively
reasonable.152 On this view, the only parties who can lay claim to a
moral right to force performance or compensation are those specific
individuals who were promised the performance. Others may
denounce nonperformance, but they cannot command a remedy; and
more to the point, they cannot coerce one.153
and noting that this standing to demand compensation is “not as a [member] of the moral
community,” but rather “as an individual involved in the transaction”). We can also see this
type of standing recognized in Joel Feinberg’s account of a claim right. See JOEL FEINBERG,
The Nature and Value of Rights, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 143, 150
(1980).
150. Gilbert, Scanlon on Promissory Obligation, supra note 141, at 101.
151. Id.
152. See GILBERT, POLITICAL OBLIGATION, supra note 148, at 162.
153. Gilbert, Scanlon on Promissory Obligation, supra note 141, at 101. As a normative
matter, it may be questioned why such a special standing should exist. More generally, one
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Conventional morality commonly includes the idea of special
standing as a feature of moral rights. From this perspective,
promisees not only possess a moral right to performance, but in
appropriate cases, they uniquely possess standing to do something
about a breach.154 This same moral intuition is also applicable in
other settings. If one person negligently injures another, a bystander could demand that the harm be corrected. It is questionable
whether a third-party bystander has the standing to go over to the
wrongdoer’s house and force compensation for the injury. Any
member of the moral community would have standing to demand
that the wrong be remedied, but only the wronged party or someone
acting on her behalf may have standing to forcefully remedy the
wrong.155
B. Summary
Moral rights commonly involve relational rights and duties: a
right holder corresponds to a duty holder and vice versa.156 Some
moral rights have a special congruity with the use of forcible
coercion to make the duty holder comply with his or her duties.157
Moreover, right holders often possess a special standing to bring
about this compliance. Third-party bystanders may not typically
might question whether second-person morality offers a correct view of what we ought to do.
In describing this idea of special standing, however, I do not seek to demonstrate that such
standing is mandated by morality as such. The interpretive account of private law in this
Article will show how private law legal doctrines are understandable in terms of a particular
conception of interpersonal morality. A consequentialist might dispute this conception on
normative grounds while accepting that it is a part of commonly held moral intuitions. See
infra note 236 and accompanying text. It is enough for present purposes that we recognize the
notion of special standing as a widely held moral viewpoint, irrespective of its correspondence
to our individual normative commitments.
154. Conventional morality does not always follow this principle, however. Often, a
distinguishing factor is urgency. If an individual had his or her bag stolen by a thief, it would
seem morally legitimate for a bystander to step forward and tackle the thief before the thief
gets away. Bystanders may sometimes have the standing to enforce another individual’s
moral rights and not merely to request compliance. That said, both Darwall and Gilbert do
capture a common intuition about special standing in the moral rights setting. See DARWALL,
supra note 111, at 18; Gilbert, Scanlon on Promissory Obligation, supra note 141, at 83. I wish
to thank Adam Hosein for suggesting the example described in this footnote.
155. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
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step in and force compliance in these cases unless they are acting on
behalf of the individual right holder.158
This analysis suggests parallels between the structure of moral
rights, duties, wrongs, and enforcement, on the one hand, and the
structure of legal rights, duties, wrongs, and enforcement, on the
other. The special standing of a wronged party in the moral setting
is frequently reflected in legal contexts. Part III of this Article offers
an explanation of why it is that legal and moral enforcement rights
correspond in this way. Part III will also show how the moral rights
theory improves upon prior explanatory accounts of private law.
III. THE LINK BETWEEN PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS OF ACTION
Civil recourse theorists devote substantial attention to the private
right of action, in some cases justifying it in terms of a Lockean
social contract.159 Unsurprisingly, these theorists do not claim that
an actual, real life social contract provides for civil recourse.160
Instead, a social contract metaphor is used to explain the normative
structure visible in private law doctrine.161 The present Article
draws on this literature and its focus on the structure of private law.
However, this Article will suggest a new way to understand what
private rights of action accomplish.
As set forth below, the private right of action is neither about
corrective justice nor about one individual “acting against” another
—it is about giving an individual a means to enforce moral rights
when that individual has standing to legitimately enforce them.162
Because the state frequently requires individuals to give up their
extra-legal enforcement rights, the state provides a private right of
action as a substitute. A plaintiff ’s bringing suit in the courts is
thus a way for the plaintiff to enforce her moral rights without engaging the state in any particular aim of correcting wrongs.163 This
158. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
159. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 735-38; see also Goldberg, supra note 2,
at 541-44 (describing the Lockean theory of a right to redress).
160. See Zipursky, Private Law, supra note 2, at 642.
161. See id. at 654.
162. Unless, that is, “acting against” another is read in a different fashion from the notions
of accountability currently adopted by civil recourse theorists. See supra note 17.
163. Cf. Zipursky, Private Law, supra note 2, at 654 (suggesting that “[c]hoices courts make
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legal avenue of enforcement is given in exchange for the individual’s
otherwise purely private methods of self-help.
A. The Social Contract Metaphor and Private Law
It is worth revisiting the recourse theorist’s suggestion that
private law can be understood in terms of a Lockean social contract.
As noted, the civil recourse approach has proven controversial due
to normative doubts about the vindictive impulses underlying a
right to act against another.164 However, the Lockean structure that
the civil recourse theorists espouse is separable from the standard
civil recourse approach. The social contract metaphor offers a
fruitful way to understand the characteristics of the private right of
action without requiring us to adopt the more controversial civil
recourse norms across private law.165 As will become apparent, the
argument fits quite well with a moral rights perspective.
John Locke famously posits that, in a state of nature, individuals
have a right to punish wrongdoings.166 This right of punishment is
given up when entering a civil society, and in return the state takes
on this role.167 Yet there is another important natural right at issue
in Locke’s account, distinct from the right of punishment. Locke
contends that individuals have a natural right to redress injuries
they have suffered.168 This right of redress belongs solely to the
injured individual.169
Locke argues that the individual’s right of redress is also given up
upon entering a civil society.170 In return for this sacrifice, the state
provides for redress.171 Much as the state takes over responsibility
for punishment, it also takes over responsibility for redress of
injuries. As Zipursky suggests, “The obligation of the individual not
about when individuals are entitled to prevail in private law are not necessarily, or even
fundamentally, choices about which outcomes are best”).
164. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
165. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
166. See LOCKE, supra note 15, at 264-65.
167. See id. at 304-05.
168. See id. at 265-66.
169. See id. at 266 (describing “[the right of] reparation, which belongs only to the injured
party”).
170. See id.
171. See id. at 305.
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to engage in private punishment is conditional on the state’s having
undertaken that role.”172 Similarly, he adds, “It seems likely that
Locke held an analogous view as to the right to seek compensation
for individual injuries. There is a natural right and power to seek
compensation for an injury done to one.”173 The state’s provision of
redress for private wrongs can then be understood as an obligatory
substitute for an individual’s right to redress those wrongs through
self-help.174
Admittedly, Locke’s account seems to involve a more proactive
state role than we presently have; the private right of action leaves
discretion in the hands of the plaintiff.175 As William Blackstone
notes, legal redress requires both the state and the plaintiff to play
a role: “[W]herein the act of the parties and the act of law cooperate; the act of parties being necessary to set the law in motion,
and the process of the law being in general the only instrument, by
which the parties are enabled to procure a certain and adequate
redress.”176 This concern is readily addressed, however.
Zipursky offers an illuminating account of how Locke’s social
contract theory and Blackstone’s description of the right of action
can be brought together: “The synthesis of Locke and Blackstone ...
is the view that the power to alter a defendant’s legal status through
having a judgment entered against him—the private right of action
—is something a private party who has been wronged is entitled to
from the state.”177 Thus, “the natural right to seek redress is conceded in return for a right of civil redress, a private right of
action.”178 Given that the state has generally prohibited self-help,
the private right of action is an alternative means of redress that
parties can choose instead.

172. Zipursky, Private Law, supra note 2, at 639.
173. Id.
174. This is not to say that self-help has been eliminated from private law altogether. Selfhelp is a notable remedy under Uniform Commercial Code Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-609
(2008). Nor is this the lone example. For an insightful analysis of how self-help matters for
contract law, see Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Self-Help Remedies in Contract, 89 B.U. L. REV.
1397 (2009).
175. See Zipursky, Private Law, supra note 2, at 640 (discussing how Locke’s
understanding “does not match the law we actually have”).
176. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *22.
177. Zipursky, Private Law, supra note 2, at 642.
178. Id.
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This analysis offers an insightful account of private rights of
action. But as elegant as this redress-based account may be, it
suffers from an immediate challenge. In order for this Lockean
argument to plausibly account for private law, there must be some
justification for thinking in terms of a natural right of redress.179
Our conception of redress matters. It is questionable whether the
argument works if private law is a recourse-based system, at least
as recourse is commonly understood. Why think the state should be
obligated to offer a path for one person to act against another? Even
if such responses are sometimes appropriate, why would we think
they are appropriate for a run-of-the-mill contract violation or for a
tort of negligence? This Article suggests an alternative to civil
recourse (at least in its standard form): the state takes on the
obligation to provide a substitute for self-help when moral enforcement rights are at stake.
B. The Moral Rights Perspective on the Right to Redress
Instead of thinking that a wronged party possesses a right to “act
against another” when there has been a violation of her legal rights,
we may recognize that the right of redress applies in cases where
the wronged party has suffered a violation of a strong moral right.
In those cases where the victim of a wrong would normally have a
moral enforcement right, the state is obligated to provide an
alternative means for the victim to bring about that enforcement.
This interpretation avoids the thorny questions raised by a natural
right to revenge or a natural right to get “satisfaction.”
The present account is also well-suited to explain the standing
rules of private law. As noted previously, in the moral realm there
is an oft-recognized distinction between the general standing that
all members of the moral community have—the general standing to
demand compliance with moral precepts—and the special standing
that a right holder possesses.180 There is a clear connection between
this special standing and Locke’s passages on the natural right of
redress.181
179. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
181. See Stephen Darwall, The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the Will, 116 ETHICS
263, 277 (2006) (discussing a right holder’s special standing to exact compensation in Lockean
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Locke’s account of the state of nature is plausibly read as a
depiction of a special standing to exact compensation possessed by
individuals whose claim rights were violated. The Lockean argument appeals to the same kind of thinking that we see in secondperson moral reasoning about which parties can make claims for
redress of a violated moral right. Of course, the appropriate redress
that should follow a violation—return of property, compensation, or
specific performance—is also an important concern. Whatever the
appropriate response may be, however, the standing to respond is
held by the right holder alone, not the general public.
Many second-personal relations—notably, those involving moral
claim rights—are such that the right holder has a special standing
to respond in certain ways to the failure of the other party to
perform his duty. Locke’s analysis of the right of redress has the
right structure to be understood in terms of this second-person
morality.182 In other words, there is a way to understand the
Lockean argument that does not implicate revenge or vindictive
aims. Moral enforcement rights are readily described in terms of a
natural right to redress.
It is also normatively plausible to think in these terms. A moral
enforcement right tends to exist when a moral right holder has a
particularly strong claim to compliance by the duty holder. Ordinary
promises, for example, do not usually justify coercion when they are
breached. The harms that result from broken contracts, thefts,
batteries, and other serious breaches, on the other hand, involve a
more significant type of injury. These are exactly the situations in
which the state plausibly owes right holders a means of enforcement. In these cases, coercion by the right holder may be more than
legitimate; the right to exercise such coercion may be an entitlement—that is, it may merit recognition in terms of a natural right
to redress.
On this account, the private right of action will often be closely
related to corrective justice. The legal right is derivative of the
plaintiff ’s moral enforcement right against the wrongdoer, and the
terms).
182. See supra note 169 (suggesting that the Lockean right of redress belongs solely to the
right holder). For a helpful discussion of how Locke’s understanding involves an individual’s
enforcement claim in the state of nature, see Katrin Flikschuh, Reason, Right, and
Revolution: Kant and Locke, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 375, 383 (2008).
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content of that moral enforcement right will often be determined in
light of corrective justice. Private rights of action are not, however,
designed as a means for the state to bring about corrective justice.
Corrective justice is not the law’s function. The private right of
action is an avenue for corrective justice in those cases in which the
plaintiff possesses moral rights to coercively bring about corrective
justice, given that self-help is no longer available. But it is the moral
enforcement right itself that justifies the state’s role.
Use of the private right of action is thus appropriately open to the
plaintiff ’s discretion. Within this rubric, there is a reason why corrective justice is not a state-compelled remedy. The rights at issue
belong to the party who was wronged.183 She gets to decide whether
to do something about being wronged, including whether to make
use of her entitlement to enforce her rights.184 If the state intervened as a matter of course, the party who was wronged would have
less control over the counterparty’s duties than her moral enforcement rights provide for.185
183. Arthur Ripstein makes a similar point. See Arthur Ripstein, As If It Had Never
Happened, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1981-82 (2007). He argues that if the state provided
for corrective justice automatically, the state would encroach on the wronged party’s rights.
See id. Part of having certain rights is being able to decide whether they should be enforced.
Ripstein suggests that the private plaintiff’s power to bring suit “turns out to be a direct
implication of the idea that tort law protects each person’s entitlement to have her means
subject to her exclusive choice.” Id. However, unlike my own account, Ripstein’s
understanding of the plaintiff’s rights in the private action setting is not grounded in an
underlying moral right to private enforcement. Ripstein contends that the legitimacy of acting
to redress the wrong is dependent upon a neutral third party’s intervention, as is provided by
the state. See Ripstein, supra note 10, at 1427. Unilateral enforcement, on this view, is
unacceptable. See id. at 1418 (“Private enforcement is not merely inconvenient: it is
inconsistent with justice because it is ultimately the rule of the stronger.”); see also ARTHUR
RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 165 (2009)
(describing the Kantian critique of private rights of enforcement). I would question, however,
whether the private right of action is best interpreted as a means to avoid the imposition of
one private party’s will upon another.
184. It might be asked, however, why we do not have a system in which the state offers to
prosecute private law cases on the condition that the wronged party consents. Our system
looks quite different. As Jason Solomon has recently indicated, the private right of action
involves the plaintiff in more than just initiating the suit; she must also prosecute her suit.
See Solomon, supra note 2, at 1805 (noting the tort system “not only allows the victim to
privately initiate the suit, but also to privately prosecute the suit”). The plaintiff’s role in
prosecuting the case fits with the idea that the private right of action is a substitute for
private enforcement; the private right of action is more than just a recognition that the
wronged party should have a choice whether to waive her rights.
185. This is not to say that the state could not legitimately provide for state prosecution
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C. Moral Enforcement Rights Versus Corrective Justice
This brings us to the diversity of remedies in private law. Some
remedial measures, such as punitive damages, may not fit the idea
that private law is concerned with moral enforcement rights.186
However, the difficulty in explaining punitive damages need not be
fatal for a moral rights-based theory of private law.187 It is one thing
to seek a unified, conceptual account of core private law doctrines
and another to insist that the only plausible explanation must
incorporate all of private law under one set of values.188 Punitive
damages are a special case, and they appear to implicate a distinct
value.189
On the other hand, all else equal, an explanatory account that
explains more legal phenomena is better than an account that
explains fewer.190 Here the moral rights account has an advantage
over standard corrective justice understandings. As civil recourse
theorists note, private law includes injunctive relief, a legal remedy
that is clearly not corrective of an existing wrong.191 The moral
rights account of private law is more expansive than a corrective
justice account in this regard. Such cases can be understood in
terms of preventive justice, and preventive justice is easy to explain
under the moral rights perspective.

of such wrongs or provide for various types of qui tam-styled rights of action. Such actions,
however, would not stem from the same justificatory source as the private right of action. See
Zipursky, Private Law, supra note 2, at 648 (discussing qui tam actions).
186. Arguably, one might posit a moral enforcement right to revenge or satisfaction from
violators of a primary moral right. I do not see how the exercise of such a right would qualify
as a form of enforcement, however, even if one did feel that moral right holders deserve this
form of recourse. In addition, the normative concerns Finnis raises could also come into play.
See supra note 103.
187. Doing so is controversial. Separating subparts of private law from the main corpus
suggests that a theorist may be conveniently defining the topic of discussion to make it fit the
theory. On the other hand, punitive damages are commonly understood to serve a distinct role
from other judicially ordered remedies. For further discussion of this issue, see supra note
106.
188. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
189. Cf. Gardner, supra note 13, at 47 (suggesting that general damages are “not reparative
in the strictest sense”).
190. This follows under the consilience norm. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
191. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 713. Again, this depends on the view that
corrective justice remedies are solely available ex post.
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The basic idea is incorporated into Locke’s discussion of the right
to redress. People have a natural right to preserve their property in
addition to their lives.192 Sometimes we can act coercively before a
wrong occurs. If one merits an avenue of redress ex post in certain
cases, it is a small leap to recognize that, in appropriate circumstances, one could also merit an avenue of prevention ex ante.
Indeed, ex ante prevention of a harm will often seem like a better
option than ex post correction of a harm.
Preventive justice is grounded in some of the same concerns that
motivate corrective justice.193 Both types of justice are concerned
with ensuring compliance with a primary duty or, failing that, the
next best thing to compliance. Indeed, preventive justice is sometimes described as a prewrong counterpart to corrective justice. As
the philosopher Jeff McMahan expresses this idea: “While preventive justice is concerned with the ex ante redistribution of harm in
accordance with liability, corrective justice, which is the goal of the
law of torts, is concerned with the ex post redistribution of harm, or
loss.”194 Read broadly, tort law is concerned with both ex ante and
ex post remedies, but McMahan’s basic insight is correct.
Under certain circumstances, the moral right to enforce a duty
antedates an actual wrong. Self-defense cases are the most salient
example, but the role for preventive justice is also significant when
it is clear a promise will be broken, at least in the setting of a strong
moral right to performance. And the same point applies to antici192. According to Locke,
Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an
uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature,
equally with any other man or number of men in the world, hath by nature a
power not only to preserve his property, that is his life, liberty and estate,
against the injuries and attempts of other men, but to judge of and punish the
breaches of that law in others as he is persuaded the offence deserves.
LOCKE, supra note 15, at 304.
193. Ernest Weinrib has suggested that corrective justice “allows for injunctions that
prevent unjust harm” for what I take to be a similar reason. See WEINRIB, supra note 1, at 144
n.41.
194. See Jeff McMahan, Laws of War, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 493, 499
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010). As McMahan has noted elsewhere, however,
the symmetry is not perfect. See Jeff McMahan, Self-Defense and the Problem of the Innocent
Attacker, 104 ETHICS 252, 279 (1994) (providing a convincing argument, based on a hypothetical fact pattern, that “one cannot infer the permissibility of preventing a harm from the
fact that the harm wrongs the victim and imposes on the injurer a duty ex post to compensate
the victim for the harm”).
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pated encroachments on property or anticipated tortious conduct. In
such cases, preventive measures often implicate a moral enforcement right.195
Legal remedies reflect these moral enforcement rights.
Injunctions are not a measure of corrective justice when they are
designed to prevent a wrong that has not yet happened. Nor are
they a clear case of acting against another, at least not in the usual
civil recourse sense.196 They often come into play in cases where one
party is likely to suffer a wrong and where the wrong will be
difficult to repair after the fact.197 These are circumstances in which,
as a matter of morality, a would-be victim of a wrong could legitimately engage in preventive justice.
As such examples suggest, the moral rights perspective is not
coterminous with at least some corrective justice accounts.198 Moral
enforcement rights explain certain noncorrective aspects of private
law, notably the availability of injunctive relief. Injunctive relief
targets wrongs that have not yet occurred and, thus, cannot yet be
corrected. Although the concept of moral enforcement is closely related to corrective justice—frequently, a moral enforcement right
will be a right to bring about corrective justice—the two concepts
are not the same.
D. Moral Enforcement Rights Versus Civil Recourse
As noted, injunctive relief is hard to square with ex post corrective justice norms.199 On the other hand, certain standard remedies
in private law are difficult to square with conventional civil recourse
195. The main difference is that, in preventive justice cases, it is generally the enforcement
of a primary moral right rather than a remedial right.
196. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
197. 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2942 (2d ed. 1995).
198. There are also cases in which the law actually permits self-help to prevent wrongs. See
Douglas Ivor Brandon et al., Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges, and Remedies in
Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REV. 845, 911 (1984). Note that a self-help
feature of private law could be problematic for theories that view private law as a needed
replacement for self-help due to the legal system’s capacity to avoid unilateral enforcement.
The moral rights theory in this Article is accepting of self-help as an option; private law is
viewed as an obligatory substitute when self-help has been prohibited, but this view of private
law is not inconsistent with residual self-help remedies.
199. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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norms. Judicial remedies support conceptual inferences about the
private right of action, and those inferences are often in tension
with the standard idea of recourse.200 If we review the different
fields within private law, the challenge for civil recourse as an
explanatory account becomes increasingly evident. At the same
time, a review of these fields demonstrates that the moral rights
account explains a considerable range of legal phenomena.
Tort law frequently provides a standard remedy—compensatory
damages—and this remedy makes the plaintiff whole. The content
of this remedy corresponds well with a moral rights account. It is
somewhat odd that a remedy that makes the plaintiff whole, or the
next best thing, should be so common if we live in a world of civil
recourse focused on wrongs (rather than wrongful losses).201 Yet this
is not an open-and-shut case. Civil recourse theorists can readily
point to other remedies as a way of countering this claim. Tort law
includes various noncorrective legal responses to wrongs, most
notably punitive damages.202 Although the evidence cuts in both
directions, civil recourse theorists might thus suggest that, overall,
the workings of the private right of action add support for their
argument.
200. This can be so even if we accept the civil recourse theorists’ view that private law does
not recognize an affirmative legal duty to pay in cases of a legal wrong. See Zipursky, Civil
Recourse, supra note 2, at 720-21. Private law may well be structured around the creation of
a legal liability when there is a wrong, but the remedies available may help us better
understand whether that legal liability stems from notions of recourse or notions of moral
enforcement rights. Zipursky rightly notes the importance of capturing the “pattern of
inferences in the law.” Id. at 712. Civil recourse theory recognizes the import of the private
right of action but overlooks what the available legal remedies can sometimes tell us about
that private right of action. Remedial patterns can indicate whether the private right of action
is an avenue of recourse or an avenue of enforcement.
201. Recourse theorists have responded to this objection in part by focusing on a notion of
proportionality. See id. at 749 (“Just as in self-defense, victims may not use force out of proportion to what is necessary to combat the kind of aggression they face, in private rights of
action, plaintiffs are not normally entitled to take from the one who wronged them more than
they need to be restored.”). They also attempt to separate the default remedial outcome from
the notion of reallocating losses. See Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, supra note 17,
at 947 (suggesting that the make-whole remedy sets an “outer boundary” of the remedy courts
will provide victims of wrongs). But why not have courts assess proportionality on a case-bycase basis? And why this precise outer boundary? There is no obvious reason to think that a
proportional way of getting satisfaction is to be made whole. It may well be that a corrective
remedy is the proportional remedy, yet it is not clear why the norm of getting satisfaction, or
revenge, should lead to this conclusion.
202. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 712-13 (discussing punitive damages).
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Contract law is different, however. An ordinary breach of contract
is a wrong, but it is often not the type of wrong that calls for getting
satisfaction or revenge.203 And even if we think contractual breaches
could sometimes support civil recourse, the standard contractual
remedies constitute a form of corrective justice.204 The expectation
remedy is a predictable outcome in a successful contracts case. If
contracts were explained by civil recourse, why would the form of
recourse be so consistently fixed in its content? Punitive damages
are rare.205 Furthermore, contract law includes the remedy of
specific performance—a remedy that is readily explained in terms
of moral enforcement rights but harder to square with recourse.206
One of the strengths of civil recourse theory is that it can explain
a large variety of remedies in tort law. Contract law is far less
variable, and the fixity of contract remedies tells us something
about the private right of action in that sphere. That said, contracts
cases involve wrongs, and at least some breaches, in rare cases, will
support claims of punitive damages.207 It is conceivable, though
difficult, to see contract law as a recourse-based section of the law.208
Contract law is not the only problem for a recourse-based interpretation, however. The law of unjust enrichment is even more
difficult for a conventional civil recourse theory to explain.
Unjust enrichment cases do not, at least initially, arise from a
defendant’s wrongful conduct. The classic case involves a mistaken
payment. For example, suppose that Y unwittingly receives X’s
money through an error made by X. X, under certain circumstances,
may legitimately coerce the return of this money, but it is a stretch
203. This is not to deny that breaches of contract may, in some cases, be taken as a cause
for moral outrage. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is For Suckers, 63
VAND. L. REV. 1003 (2010) (studying the psychological impact of contract breaches).
204. For discussion of the corrective justice underpinnings of contract remedies, see
Bridgeman, supra note 1; Gold, supra note 1.
205. See William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629,
635 (1999).
206. Indeed, Zipursky indicates that the private right of action in contract law is premised
upon a duty to pay under the contract. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 2, at 742. It
should be noted, however, that Zipursky considers specific performance cases to implicate civil
recourse. See Zipursky, Private Law, supra note 2, at 646.
207. See Dodge, supra note 205, at 635.
208. For a recent account of contract law in civil recourse terms, see generally Nathan B.
Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 529 (2011).
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to say that Y is a wrongdoer merely on the basis of his initial receipt
of the money.209 The notion of a moral enforcement right can explain
the private right of action in this type of case—the plaintiff may
legitimately force a return of the money, whether or not the defendant has committed a wrong in initially receiving that money.
In contrast, consider the civil recourse perspective. When a
plaintiff sues for restitution, is it plausible to say that the plaintiff
wants to act against the defendant?210 Is she not really just seeking
the return of her money? A review of the legal response to unjust
enrichment claims shows a clear pattern. The amount of the judicial
remedy will almost unerringly be based on the value of the unjust
enrichment.211 The restitutionary remedy fits the idea that courts
are trying to undo a transaction rather than allowing a plaintiff to
get even with a recalcitrant defendant. It is difficult to see this
action in terms of recourse.
Like injunctive relief, this area of law may challenge the corrective justice theorist as well. There is an ongoing debate as to
whether unjust enrichment cases truly implicate corrective justice
or a localized form of distributive justice.212 But, again, the moral
rights theory is not a corrective justice theory, and the idea of moral
209. The orthodox view is that no wrong has occurred in the case of an unjust enrichment.
See, e.g., PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 22 (2d ed. 2005) (“There are acquisitive wrongs
and hence there are cases of wrongful enrichment, but an unjust enrichment is never a
wrong.”).
210. Unjust enrichment cases are significant in another respect. Civil recourse theorists
contend that tort law is inconsistent with a corrective justice account because there is no
required payment of prejudgment interest when a defendant who knows he or she will be
liable delays paying damages prior to a judicial decision. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra
note 2, at 718-21. Stephen Smith has recently suggested, however, that Commonwealth
jurisdictions refuse to order damages based on a failure to make timely restitution in unjust
enrichment cases, and that unjust enrichment cases are understood to involve a prejudgment
duty to make that restitution. See Stephen A. Smith, Unjust Enrichment: Nearer to Tort than
to Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 181, 189
(Robert Chambers et al. eds., 2009). In Smith’s view, the duty to pay restitution in unjust
enrichment cases is similar to the duty to pay damages in tort—in both cases there is a legal
duty to pay, but there are no damages for late payment. See id. at 190. This interpretive
possibility makes it difficult to draw a strong inference about the legal recognition of
prejudgment duties based on the denial of damages for prejudgment delays in payment.
211. See Smith, supra note 210, at 183.
212. See Kit Barker, The Nature of Responsibility for Gain: Gain, Harm, and Keeping the
Lid on Pandora’s Box, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT,
supra note 210, at 146 n.1 (listing articles in support of corrective justice and distributive
justice views of unjust enrichment).
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enforcement rights fits well with the unjust enrichment cause of
action. In cases of unjust enrichment, it is quite reasonable to think
that the claimant should be able, as a matter of her moral rights, to
force a return of the thing transferred or its equivalent in value.213
The private right of action maps onto this moral rights understanding.
E. Summary
Although there is a place for corrective justice within a moral
rights account, the above account does not reduce to a corrective
justice theory.214 This is especially clear in cases in which courts
order injunctive relief.215 But even disputes that do involve corrective justice do not necessarily mean that the law is about corrective
justice.216 Under the moral rights theory, a corrective justice entitlement belongs to the wronged party in appropriate cases,217 yet
corrective justice is not taken as a general aim of private law.218 The
private law is instead a means for an individual who possesses a
moral enforcement right to exercise that moral enforcement right.219
The private right of action constitutes that enforcement.220
Similarly, this account does not reduce to a civil recourse theory,
at least not in its standard form. In terms of legal structure, the
213. Note that the argument can work even if one rejects the idea that the enriched party
owes a moral duty to undo the enrichment. The notion of moral enforcement rights dovetails
with Stephen Smith’s suggestion “that we regard our fundamental duty in this area of the law
[unjust enrichment] as a duty not to interfere with another’s attempt to retrieve defectively
transferred property.” Stephen A. Smith, Justifying the Law of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 2177, 2194 (2001). There may also be exceptions to this enforcement right in
interpersonal morality, such as when the enriched party has changed her position in reliance
on the mistaken payment. However, the law of unjust enrichment may also preclude recovery
in such cases. See BIRKS, supra note 209, at 208-19 (discussing the change of position defense).
214. See supra text accompanying note 198.
215. See supra Part III.C.
216. See supra Part III.B.
217. See supra Part III.B.
218. See supra text accompanying note 16.
219. See supra Part III.B. Jason Solomon has also suggested the private right of action is
a means to bring about justice, although his theory focuses on different aspects of secondpersonal morality. See Solomon, supra note 2, at 1771 (suggesting that tort law “provides a
vehicle for individuals to bring about justice, and in doing so, vindicates the notion of a
community of equals who are answerable to one another and expected to treat one another
with equal respect”).
220. See supra Part III.C.
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civil recourse theorists are exactly right: private law involves a
three-party relation with the state obligated to provide an avenue
for a private individual to seek redress from a wrongdoer.221 Yet
much turns on the meaning of “redress.”222 The private action is not
ordinarily about providing an avenue for revenge or for acting
against another to address the affront of a wrong.223 In most cases,
the apparent right to “act against another,” which civil recourse
theorists note,224 is better understood in terms of a claimant’s right
to bring about corrective justice or, in some cases, preventive
justice.225 Recourse as traditionally conceived is not the underlying
principle in these instances; rather it is the wronged party’s moral
enforcement right.226
A moral rights account makes use of the Lockean idea that there
is a natural right to redress without implicating controversial norms
of private revenge or even the idea of “getting satisfaction.”227 The
private right of action is a state-provided substitute for individuals’
exercise of self-help.228 Having prohibited self-help, the state takes
on an obligation to provide an alternative means for individuals to
enforce their moral rights.229 The limitations on standing to initiate
the private right of action make sense once we recognize how
standing also applies in the realm of moral rights.230 And the notion
of moral enforcement rights explains both corrective and preventive
remedies.231 The moral rights approach thus renders intelligible
several core features of private law: private rights of action;232 substantive standing;233 and a broad variety of remedial measures.234

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See supra Part I.D.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra note 201.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra text accompanying note 12.
See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra Part III.C-D.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.C-D.
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IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVATE LAW
An interpretive account of private law does not prescribe outcomes. Nevertheless, an interpretive account can have normative
implications. As noted, the desirability of legal change often depends
on how we understand the status quo.235 If we have a concern with
reforming the law, it often matters what the existing law is. For
example, stare decisis norms, if accepted, mean that the correct
interpretation of legal doctrine can help us figure out how or
whether the law should change.236 For normative theories that
consider stare decisis to hold at least some force, an interpretive
account has relevance.237
In some cases, however, an interpretive account has added importance. Some normative theories call for change to private law
based on our understanding of the legal status quo. For example,
scholars have recently criticized certain private law doctrines by
claiming that their rationale diverges from principles of interpersonal morality.238 Arguably, such divergence is a serious problem.
Yet before we can address the alleged problems caused by the law’s
rationale, we must first determine what that rationale is. This type
of critique thus raises a basic interpretive question: what is the
rationale of private law? If a divergence between legal and moral
principles is problematic, then a sound understanding of private law
concepts—from the internal point of view—is crucial to assessing
private law.
Seana Shiffrin’s recent work offers a good example of how an
interpretive account can matter for these purposes. Shiffrin argues
that certain types of divergence between law and morality are
undesirable.239 In particular, when participation in a legal practice
235. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
236. Cf. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, supra note 40, at 476 (“[A] first step in
determining the answer to a legal question is determining how the concepts within the law
apply to the question at hand.”). We may wish to change the law, but a first step would still
be to figure out what the law is, and this calls for an interpretive inquiry that takes seriously
legal concepts.
237. See supra text accompanying note 40.
238. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 11, at 710-12.
239. See id. at 715 (describing the conditions under which a divergence between legal and
moral principles will burden moral agents).

1922

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1873

involves simultaneous participation in a moral practice, she suggests that a divergence between law and morality should be
avoided.240 The reason is that, in her view, moral agents should not
be faced with conflicting messages about their duties, and a
divergence between law and morality can create such conflicts.241
Notice, however, that this argument is closely linked to one’s
understanding of the rationale that underlies private law.
Shiffrin’s concerns are especially relevant to contract law.
According to her account, contract law diverges from morality in
light of the contractual overlap with promising.242 A contract is often
portrayed as a promissory relationship.243 And contract law doctrines, at least purportedly, are premised on the idea that people
should feel free to breach their agreements as long as they pay
damages.244 Promissory morality, in contrast, frowns upon a breach
of promise even if damages are paid, and even if the breach is
efficient.245 Consequently, contract law appears to disregard the
moral duty that a promisor owes to a promisee.246 If Shiffrin is right,
then the rationale of contract law conflicts with moral principles.
This Article offers an answer to this critique by suggesting a
different way to understand contract law. Shiffrin focuses on a
promisor’s moral duties.247 Yet contract law, like other fields within
private law, is best understood in terms of moral enforcement
rights. Contract law is not about the contractual promisor’s moral
duties to the promisee, and so we should not be looking for contract
law doctrines to parallel a promisor’s moral duties. Once we consider moral enforcement rights, the meaning of contractual remedies changes. Part IV.B will suggest that, if we focus on a prom-

240. See id. at 717.
241. See id. at 715.
242. See id. at 722.
243. See id. at 721 (“U.S. contract law represents that a contract is an enforceable
promise.”). Not all theories of contract are grounded in promissory morality. See, e.g., Michael
G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 801 (2008). The relevant point for
purposes of Shiffrin’s theory is that contracts are represented in this way.
244. See Shiffrin, supra note 11, at 730-31 (describing such a view in terms of efficient
breach theory).
245. See id. at 732 (“[A] virtuous agent cannot accept the economic benefits of breach as
constituting a sufficient, or even a partial, contributory justification for the law’s content.”).
246. See id. at 722.
247. See id.
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isee’s moral enforcement rights, contract law may actually represent
a convergence between legal doctrine and moral principles.
A. The Accommodationist Critique of Contract Law
As indicated above, Seana Shiffrin has recently offered an
important claim about how the law should relate to morality. Her
approach is known as accommodationism.248 Shiffrin contends that
the law should accommodate interpersonal morality by avoiding
certain conflicts between legal doctrine and moral principles.249 She
then uses contract law as an illustration.250 If she is correct in her
interpretation of contract law, then the principles that justify
contract law are, quite possibly, contrary to the principles of
interpersonal morality.251 This conflict, in turn, is problematic for
the moral agent.252
Shiffrin claims that moral agents should not have to contend with
legal principles that conflict with their moral commitments. As she
argues, “When the directives of law and morality regulate the same
phenomena, moral agents have to negotiate two distinct sets of
norms.”253 These conflicting directives present an undesirable
burden on moral agents, given that many individuals believe there
is a moral duty to obey the law.254 The potential for this burden, in
turn, suggests we should reform legal doctrine in order to avoid such
conflicts.
Once we adopt this perspective, however, much will depend on
the justification that actually underpins legal doctrine. Shiffrin contends that “the law and its rationale should be transparent and
accessible to the moral agent.”255 She also states that “the law’s
rationale should not present a conflict for the interested citizen qua
moral agent.”256 As these remarks suggest, the correct interpretation
of the law is vital to the application of Shiffrin’s normative theory.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See id. at 717.
See id. at 713-14.
See, e.g., id. at 720.
See id. at 709.
See id.
Id. at 715.
See id.
Id. at 718.
Id.
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This follows because if we have not accurately interpreted the law,
we may not have accurately discerned a divergence between legal
principles and morality.
Consider then how the specifics of contract law fit into Shiffrin’s
argument. At first glance, Shiffrin is exactly right in drawing
attention to contract doctrines. Contract law is a classic case of a
legal practice that simultaneously implicates nonlegal moral norms.
Contract law in the United States presents itself as a promise-based
practice.257 And, indeed, ordinary citizens and legal theorists often
draw a connection between contractual obligations and promissory
obligations.258 Moral agents often see a breach of a contract to be a
breach of a promise.259
This raises the possibility that the law of contracts diverges from
promissory morality in an undesirable way. Indeed, such a divergence is precisely what Shiffrin claims, based on the manner in
which contract law remedies breaches and the apparent reason for
these legal features.260
Notably, efficient breach theory is a prominent part of the contracts literature.261 A number of scholars have encouraged courts to
facilitate efficient contractual breaches.262 If contract law facilitates
breaches of contract on such a basis—for example, by ordering expectation damages instead of specific performance263—then contract
law has apparently adopted principles that conflict with the moral
duty to keep one’s word.264

257. See id. at 721 (“[A] contract [is] ‘a promise ... for the breach of which the law gives a
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.’” (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979))).
258. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981).
259. See Shiffrin, supra note 11, at 731.
260. See id. at 731-32.
261. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation and the Theory of
Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988).
262. See Shiffrin, supra note 11, at 730 (discussing varying scholarly approaches to the
efficient breach theory).
263. See id. at 722-23 (indicating that the typical remedy is expectation damages, not
specific performance).
264. There is, however, significant debate as to whether contract doctrines actually diverge
from morality in the way Shiffrin claims. For an important challenge along these lines, see
Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2007),
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/cfried.pdf.
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In addition, contract law has a variety of remedial doctrines that
do seem to facilitate breaches. For example, contract law tends to
favor expectation damages over specific performance as a remedy.265
Shiffrin thus asks the following question: “Could the virtuous agent
accept some version of efficient breach theory as a justification for
these remedial rules?”266 Shiffrin argues that the moral agent would
be put in the position of accepting laws that are justified by a
rationale that is not consistent with her moral commitments.267
Contract law, on this account, presents an undesirable conflict between the law’s aim to facilitate certain breaches and the promisekeeping principles of the moral agent.268
B. The Import of Moral Enforcement Rights
For present purposes, let us assume that Shiffrin is right in her
general accommodationist approach. Let us also assume that, under
promissory morality, if a promisor breaches his promise, there is a
duty to perform after the fact rather than a duty to perform or pay
damages.269 Even if we adopt Shiffrin’s framework, it makes sense
to take into account precisely how enforcement fits into promissory
morality.270 Shiffrin focuses on moral duties,271 but moral enforcement rights should also be a central concern. Promissory morality
is not just a matter of primary duties or even remedial duties. It is,
in addition, concerned with a promisee’s right to legitimately enforce certain promises.

265. See Shiffrin, supra note 11, at 722-23.
266. See id. at 731.
267. See id.
268. See id. at 732-33.
269. Not all theorists would necessarily agree with Shiffrin’s premises regarding
promissory morality in the contract setting. See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of
Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603 (2009); Alan Schwartz & Daniel Markovits,
The Myth of Efficient Breach (Yale Law Sch. Faculty Scholarship Series, Working Paper No.
93, 2010), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/93.
270. It is important to note, however, that Shiffrin’s apparent concern is with promissory
morality as such, rather than with promissory conventions. Cf. Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach
of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551, 1551 n.2 (2009) (assessing the morality of
promissory breach in terms of “nonlegal, objectively grounded normative principles”). This
Article will use commonly held understandings of promissory morality as a starting point.
Disagreement over promissory morality may nonetheless affect the conclusions reached.
271. See Shiffrin, supra note 11, at 709.
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Recognition that private law is premised on moral enforcement
rights can account for cases in which promisors owe a duty to
perform, yet contract law will not require performance. For example,
consider the rarity of specific performance.272 Shiffrin suggests that
“a promisor is morally expected to keep her promise through
performance.”273 The promissory duty is not to perform or pay
damages on this view. Yet contract law frequently permits a
breaching party to pay damages rather than forcing performance.
Shiffrin concludes: “If contract law ran parallel to morality, then
contract law would—as the norms of promises do—require that
promisors keep their promises as opposed merely to paying off their
promisees.”274 Given the judicial reluctance to issue orders for specific performance, Shiffrin discerns a divergence from promissory
morality.
Nevertheless, this Article suggests another way to view the
problem. Promises are often seen as commitments to perform, not
to perform or pay damages.275 Likewise, in cases of breach, a
promisor’s remedial duty is often seen as a duty to perform after the
fact, not to perform or pay damages.276 However, these moral
principles do not entail that there is anything wrong with contract
law or its rationale. The key insight is to see that, even in cases in
which there is a remedial duty to perform, this does not automatically mean the promisee has a moral right to require performance.
The move from moral duties to legitimate coercive responses is
context dependent.
The important distinction here involves the line between what the
promisee has a moral right to in terms of remedies and what the
promisee has a right to in terms of coercing remedies. Perhaps as a
default rule a promisee does have a remedial moral right to performance.277 But even so, the promisee’s moral enforcement right
272. See id. at 722-23. Another useful illustration is the consideration doctrine, discussed
supra note 137 and accompanying text. Although Shiffrin sees a divergence between the cases
in which courts enforce contractual promises and the cases in which promisors owe
performance, Shiffrin, supra note 11, at 722-23, a focus on moral enforcement rights suggests
that there is, for the most part, a convergence.
273. Shiffrin, supra note 11, at 722.
274. Id.
275. See Gold, supra note 1, at 54 (discussing this issue).
276. Id.
277. See Shiffrin, supra note 270, at 1567.
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may nonetheless be an enforcement right to assess expectation
damages. Remedial moral rights can differ in content from primary
moral rights; so too moral enforcement rights can differ in content
from remedial moral rights.278
Recall the story of the house and the table from the Introduction
to this Article. B has a moral right to performance of a promise—delivery of a table on a certain date. B would also have a
remedial moral right in the case of nonperformance. Her remedial
moral right might call for delivery on the next available date. But
granting these premises, it does not automatically follow that B has
a right to force performance on that next available date. This is a
separate question of promissory morality.
Depending on context, a promisee’s moral enforcement right
might take the form of compensation for nonperformance and
nothing more.279 In some cases—for example, a long-term services
contract—it might be immoral for the promisee to physically force
the promisor to perform if the promisor refuses to do so.280 This
moral constraint on enforcement could apply even if the promisor is
morally obligated to perform or to do the next best thing.
On this basis, Shiffrin’s critique of specific performance doctrine
falls into doubt. It is true that the law occasionally precludes a
promisee from seeking a specific performance remedy when the
promisor is morally obligated to perform.281 In such cases, however,
promissory morality would likely also preclude the equivalent
remedy of self-help. Contract law may therefore converge with
promissory morality. In those instances in which a promisee possesses moral enforcement rights, contract law generally also provides for legal enforcement rights; in those cases in which the

278. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
279. Shiffrin recognizes that there could be distinctively legal reasons to adopt damages
versus specific performance, for example, administrative costs. See Shiffrin, supra note 270,
at 1568. My point is different. The suggestion here is that the reasons against specific
performance need not be distinctively legal; there are reasons in the realm of interpersonal
morality why a promisee may not have a moral enforcement right that includes specific
performance under certain circumstances. Those same reasons carry over into the legal
setting.
280. Cf. Gold, supra note 1, at 54 (discussing how forcing a promisor to perform can be
similar to enslavement).
281. See Shiffrin, supra note 11, at 723.
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promisee lacks moral enforcement rights, contract law tends not to
permit enforcement.
If A had promised, instead of a table, that he would build a house
for B in return for her labor in building his house, B would not have
a moral enforcement right that would permit her to force A to start
construction. The moral enforcement right in this case is not
identical in content to B’s primary moral right nor to her remedial
moral right. B has a primary moral right to the promised construction of the house, and she also has a remedial right to the next best
thing if A breaches; but she does not have a moral enforcement right
to make A perform. She would, instead, have a moral enforcement
right to claim compensation.
It can be morally wrong—indeed, it can involve the commission
of a wrong—to force someone to perform a burdensome service, even
when that individual owes a duty to perform that service. In such
cases, the promisor’s autonomy should trump any moral enforcement right to force specific performance.282 A moral agent would not
have any greater freedom to force specific performance when we
assess these situations in terms of moral rights than she would
under the doctrines of contract law.283 The promisor’s duty to
perform can still be taken seriously in both settings—moral and
legal.
C. Summary
Interpretations of private law can help us to see whether private
law doctrines diverge from the principles of interpersonal morality.
Some commentators see a divergence, at least with respect to
contract law.284 These claims of divergence, however, are dependent
on a particular view of the rationale for private law remedies.285

282. See Gold, supra note 1, at 53-58.
283. Indeed, there are various potential limitations on moral enforcement rights that could
affect the availability of otherwise deserved remedies. Cf. JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE
REALM OF RIGHTS 109 (1990) (“If you think, with Locke, that there would be morality (though
no law) in the state of nature, then I think you must agree that not just any bit of violent selfhelp is permissible in the state of nature.”).
284. See supra text accompanying note 242.
285. See supra Part IV.A.
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This Article calls these claims into doubt by explaining how private
law is connected to a plaintiff ’s moral enforcement rights.286
Contract law, at least as it is commonly understood, involves
individuals in the moral practice of promising.287 If core features of
contract law are justified by norms that reject the implications of
promissory morality, then contract law may raise serious
concerns.288 Indeed, recent scholarship has argued that contract law
should be reformed on this basis due to its allegedly inadequate
appreciation for promissory obligations.289 This Article suggests a
response.
Granting that ordinary promises result in a moral obligation to
perform, not all promises create strong moral rights.290 In cases of
breach, it may be morally questionable for a promisee to force the
promisor to perform. Such coercion may in fact be immoral.291 Only
certain promises—promises for consideration being a classic
example—result in a promisee possessing moral enforcement
rights.292 And, when moral enforcement rights do exist, specific
performance will only sometimes be a morally appropriate means of
enforcement.293
If the moral rights theory of private law is correct, then the
private right of action is a reflection of the moral enforcement rights
possessed by a plaintiff who was wronged.294 The private right of
action offers a substitute means of enforcement, given the limitations on self-help.295 For contract law, the expectation damages
remedy then makes good sense: a promisee often possesses a moral
enforcement right to correct the promisor’s wrong, but she may not
use any means available.296 Certain limits on the legal remedy
—such as limits on specific performance—correspond reasonably

286. See supra Part IV.B.
287. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
288. See supra text accompanying note 268.
289. See supra Part IV.A.
290. See supra Part IV.B.
291. See supra text accompanying note 280.
292. Cf. Gold, supra note 138, at 116 (discussing the doctrine of consideration, moral rights,
and coercion).
293. See supra text accompanying note 282.
294. See supra Part III.D.
295. See supra text accompanying note 12.
296. See supra text accompanying note 273.
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well to the moral limits on what a promisee can legitimately do to
enforce her moral rights.297
CONCLUSION
Conceptual accounts of private law usually take one of two forms:
corrective justice accounts or civil recourse accounts.298 Both
theories have offered powerful arguments against each other.
Corrective justice accounts struggle to explain the variety of legal
remedies that courts provide.299 Civil recourse accounts are often
challenged based on the normative principles they seem to endorse.300 This Article offers an alternative approach, one that
improves upon the leading alternatives.
Moral enforcement rights are the key to understanding private
law.301 A wronged party’s use of coercion to correct a wrong is often
permissible in a state of nature.302 When certain moral rights are
breached, the wronged party acquires a moral enforcement right to
redress that wrong.303 For good reason, civil society largely prohibits
self-help remedies. Yet the presence of the state does not mean that
individuals give up their moral enforcement rights altogether.304
Drawing on the social contract metaphor, we can see the private
right of action as a substitute for a wronged party’s acts of purely
private enforcement, available in those cases in which self-help
would be appropriate but for the state’s prohibition of such conduct.305
On this theory, the state’s interest in private law is not in doing
corrective justice as such but rather in empowering the plaintiff to
act. The private right of action is the means that the state provides.
The plaintiff is not generally given a right to revenge or even to
satisfaction, however. For the most part, private rights of action are
not vindictive. The plaintiff is instead empowered to bring about a
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See supra note 279.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.D.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra text accompanying note 166.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra text accompanying note 174.
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correction of a wrong (or wrongful loss) or to prevent that wrong in
the first place. In other words, private law is designed to allow
individuals to enforce their moral rights.306
Once we see private law in these terms, we can explain a number
of core features of private law doctrine. The conception of moral
rights and duties described in this Article is a conception that
recognizes the special standing of right holders.307 The legal
standing to initiate a private right of action reflects these commonly
held moral principles. Various private law remedies are also
explained. Moral enforcement rights account for legal remedies that
make the plaintiff whole.308 Likewise, moral enforcement rights
account for injunctive relief.309 The scope of the theory is also
substantial. Various fields within private law—from torts, to contracts, to unjust enrichment—make sense under this theory.310
Finally, the moral rights theory allows us to better assess certain
normative claims.311 Recent scholarship has critiqued private law
doctrine—in particular, contract doctrine—for a perceived divergence from the principles of interpersonal morality.312 This Article
calls these critiques into question. Private law is best understood,
not in terms of a defendant’s moral duties, but in terms of a plaintiff’s legitimate claim to enforcement.313 Recognizing this feature of
private law suggests that several controversial legal doctrines may
actually represent a convergence with moral principles.

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.D.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.

